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TAKING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
Rafael I. Pardo *
Abstract: Perhaps more so than any other area of law affecting individuals of low-tomoderate means, bankruptcy poignantly presents an affordability paradox: the system’s
purpose is to relieve individuals from financial distress, yet it simultaneously demands a
significant commitment of resources to obtain such relief. To date, no one has undertaken a
comprehensive study of the complexities and costs of the litigation burden that Congress has
imposed on self-represented debtors who seek a fresh start in bankruptcy. In order to explore
the problems inherent in a system that sometimes necessitates litigation as the path for
vindicating a debtor’s statutory right to a discharge, this Article focuses on the particular
example of debtors who seek to discharge their educational debt (e.g., student loans) through
bankruptcy. Such debt may be discharged only if the debtor can establish through a fullblown lawsuit, essentially governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that repaying
the debt would impose an undue hardship on the debtor.
Using an original dataset of educational-debt dischargeability determinations, this Article
reveals that, even when controlling for a variety of factors, including a debtor’s financial
characteristics and applicable legal standards, the typical self-represented debtor in such
proceedings has only a 28.5% chance of litigation success, which pales in comparison to the
56.2% success rate of a similarly situated debtor who is represented. This finding casts
serious doubt on the litigation framework that has been implemented to resolve disputes over
a debtor’s discharge rights. After exploring various approaches to reforming the framework,
this Article concludes that our reform efforts will signify how committed we are as a society
to deliver bankruptcy law’s promise of a fresh start to financially distressed individuals—to
wit, whether we are willing to take bankruptcy rights seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
More than forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court
proclaimed the simple, yet harsh, truth that “[t]here is no constitutional
right to obtain a discharge of one’s debts in bankruptcy.” 1 Nonetheless,
it is abundantly clear that the bankruptcy discharge constitutes a
statutory right. 2 Unfortunately, vindicating the right to a discharge has
proved to be elusive for certain individual debtors, not so much as a
result of substantive eligibility rules, 3 but rather because of procedural
barriers that increase the complexity of accessing the right. With
increased procedural complexity, the costs of legal representation for

1. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286
(1991) (“We have previously held that a debtor has no constitutional or ‘fundamental’ right to a
discharge in bankruptcy. We also do not believe that, in the context of provisions designed to
exempt certain claims from discharge, a debtor has an interest in discharge sufficient to require a
heightened standard of proof.” (citing Kras, 409 U.S. at 445–46)).
2. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1967 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“No doubt certain aspects of bankruptcy involve rights lying outside the core of the
judicial power. The most obvious of these is the right to discharge, which a party may obtain if he
satisfies certain statutory criteria.”); cf. Kras, 409 U.S. at 447 (referring to bankruptcy discharge as
“a legislatively created benefit” and “a statutory benefit”).
3. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 416 (2005)
[hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts] (discussing bankruptcy eligibility rules and
discharge eligibility rules).
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right vindication also increase, thus making representation unaffordable
for some debtors. 4 Those debtors face the choice of either foregoing an
attempt to vindicate the right or seeking to vindicate it without the
assistance of counsel. For debtors who represent themselves, the
question arises whether the lack of legal representation has made them
worse off than if they had been represented.
This question has previously been explored with respect to individual
debtors who represent themselves in their bankruptcy cases, and the
research has found that self-represented debtors have fared worse than
their represented counterparts. 5 The question, however, has not been
thoroughly explored with respect to individual debtors who represent
themselves in litigation related to their statutory right to discharge. As
discussed below in greater detail, bankruptcy cases usually do not
involve litigation for most individual debtors. When litigation does arise,
some of it, including discharge litigation, will entail a full-blown federal
lawsuit, subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and some
variations thereon.
In a recent appeal involving a self-represented inmate asserting a
Section 1983 claim6 against prison administrators and staff, Judge
Richard Posner astutely noted that “[p]ure adversary procedure works
best when there is at least approximate parity between the adversaries.” 7
In the setting of bankruptcy, this observation resonates loudly.
Individual debtors routinely file for bankruptcy relief as a result of
financial distress. It does not take a lot of imagination to realize that
financially distressed debtors will have limited means to retain any
counsel, let alone counsel that is highly skilled, competent, and
efficient. 8 On the other hand, repeat institutional creditors who litigate
against debtors have considerable resources at their disposal that enable
them to secure robust representation.

4. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo, Self-Representation and the Dismissal of Chapter 7 Cases, in
BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 87, 90–91 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy
Radice eds., 2016) [hereinafter Pardo, Self-Representation]; see also Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering
the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 166 (2014)
(“Access to legal representation becomes even more difficult as litigation costs increase.”).
5. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing a cause of action against any person who, acting under
color of state law, abridges the federal constitutional or statutory rights of the plaintiff).
7. Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2015).
8. See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2012) (Lipez, J.,
concurring) (“[A] struggling debtor who lacks the resources to pay a Chapter 7 attorney’s fee up
front has limited options . . . . I have no reason to think . . . that competent bankruptcy legal advice
is readily available for free.”).
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When bankruptcy litigation occurs, we can expect lack of parity
between represented debtors and represented creditors, with the resource
asymmetry favoring the latter. Taking it a step further, when the dispute
involves a self-represented debtor and a represented creditor, we can
expect the resource gap to become a gaping chasm. This reality demands
a close examination of and critical inquiry into the decision to use
complex procedure to channel bankruptcy litigation involving individual
debtors, a challenge to which this Article responds.
This Article seeks to empirically evaluate the effect of selfrepresentation on success in discharge litigation by focusing on
determinations regarding the dischargeability of educational debt in
bankruptcy (e.g., student loans). Such debt is not automatically
discharged in bankruptcy; rather, the debt will be deemed dischargeable
if a debtor establishes that repayment of the debt would impose an undue
hardship. 9 That showing must be made within the framework of a fullblown federal lawsuit—that is, pure adversary procedure. 10 Analyses of
the data gathered for this study—a total of 1,430 proceedings filed
nationwide during the 2011 and 2012 calendar years—provides support
for the proposition that complex procedure creates access-to-justice
barriers for self-represented debtors who seek to vindicate their
discharge rights. Even when controlling for a variety of factors,
including a debtor’s financial characteristics and applicable legal
standards, the typical self-represented debtor in such proceedings has
only a 28.5% chance of litigation success, which pales in comparison to
the 56.2% success rate of a similarly situated debtor who is
represented. 11 This finding casts serious doubt on the litigation
framework that has been implemented to resolve disputes over a debtor’s
discharge rights.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a backdrop for
assessing individual debtors’ need for legal representation in Chapter 7
bankruptcy cases and litigation in connection with those cases. Part II
presents an empirical study whose findings should prompt a
reconceptualization of the role of procedure in bankruptcy litigation
involving individual debtors. Part III explores various approaches to
reforming the extant litigation framework. This Article concludes that
our approaches to procedural reform will signify how committed we are
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
10. See infra notes 280–82 (discussing how disputes in bankruptcy are resolved either as
adversary proceedings or as contested matters and how the former are more procedurally complex
than the latter).
11. See infra Part II.D.
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as a society to deliver bankruptcy law’s promise of a fresh start to
financially distressed individuals—to wit, whether we are willing to take
bankruptcy rights seriously.
I.

ASSESSING THE NEED FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN
BANKRUPTCY

Bankruptcy is supposed to be, at least in its modern incarnation, a
haven for debtors suffering from financial distress. 12 Filing for
bankruptcy automatically gives rise to an injunction that prohibits,
among other things, collection activities by creditors, 13 thereby marking
the beginning of what will potentially be a new financial life for the
debtor. Merely filing for bankruptcy, however, does not guarantee that
the debtor will be afforded the major substantive relief that bankruptcy
law offers—a discharge. 14 If a debtor is to have “a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt,” 15 a release from personal liability
for such debt becomes imperative. After all, such liability is the
cornerstone for the enforcement of debts in our society. 16 The
bankruptcy discharge effectuates such a release by prohibiting creditors
from recovering their pre-bankruptcy debts as a personal liability of the
debtor. 17
The path to discharge, however, is not always straightforward.
Bankruptcy law is highly specialized and technical, including the
provisions of the law that relate to consumer bankruptcies. 18
Accordingly, if a debtor is to successfully navigate the complex path that
ultimately culminates in a discharge, it stands to reason that the
12. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 471, 475–76 (2007) [hereinafter Pardo, Judicial Function]. See generally Charles
Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325
(1991).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
14. See, e.g., id. § 727.
15. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
16. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (1996).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
18. See, e.g., Dignity Health v. Seare (In re Seare), 493 B.R. 158, 220 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2013)
(“Being able to trust lawyers to protect one’s property is especially important for consumer
bankruptcy debtors, who typically seek representation in dire circumstances and face a complex
legal process.”); In re Malewicki, 142 B.R. 353, 357 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) (“Bankruptcy is a
specialized area of practice. Even consumer bankruptcy cases involve complex federal bankruptcy
laws and related state laws.”); 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 79 (1997) (“No area of bankruptcy law is more complex than consumer bankruptcy.”).
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assistance of an expert will be indispensable in doing so. 19
Nonindividual entities, 20 such as corporations and partnerships, cannot
act without the assistance of their agents, including the lawyers who
represent them in connection with legal action. As such, nonindividual
entities cannot forego the assistance of lawyers when legal
representation is required. One might therefore expect that, if a legal
entity sought bankruptcy relief, it would seek out the assistance of
counsel with expertise in the area. 21 On the other hand, when individuals
seek bankruptcy relief, they have a choice. They can either go it alone or
seek the assistance of an attorney. 22
In order to properly contextualize a debtor’s need for legal
representation when seeking a bankruptcy discharge, one must
understand that the nature of representation will differ depending on
whether the facts and circumstances of the debtor’s case will provide a
basis for seeking to deny the debtor a discharge altogether or seeking a
determination that, notwithstanding the debtor’s entitlement to a
discharge, a particular debt should be deemed nondischargeable. If the
facts and circumstances do not provide such a basis, a debtor who has
sought a Chapter 7 discharge is highly unlikely to encounter litigation
whose outcome would preclude the debtor from obtaining a discharge.
But if such a basis does exist, the debtor will have to contend with
complex and protracted discharge litigation whose outcome could result
in denial of discharge or a discharge of reduced scope. The remainder of

19. See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2012) (Lipez, J.,
concurring) (“Although [a debtor] theoretically could proceed pro se, I doubt that bankrupt
individuals will ordinarily be able to navigate the complexities of the bankruptcy process on their
own.”).
20. This Article uses the term “nonindividual entity” to describe an entity that is not a natural
person (i.e., a human being). Under the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he term ‘entity’ includes person,
estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(15), and “[t]he term
‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and corporation,” id. § 101(41).
21. See generally Matthew Cormak, Note, The Cost of Representation: An Argument for
Permitting Pro Se Representation of Small Corporations in Bankruptcy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
222, 224–30 (2011) (discussing the general requirement of attorney representation for corporations
in bankruptcy).
22. Of course, self-representation does not necessarily mean that the debtor will lack assistance.
For example, some debtors may enlist the aid of nonattorneys, which falls short of formal legal
representation. One example of such assistance is that of a bankruptcy petition preparer (“BPP”),
which the Bankruptcy Code defines as “a person, other than an attorney for the debtor or an
employee of such attorney under the direct supervision of such attorney, who prepares for
compensation a document for filing.” 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(1). The Code sets forth standards
governing the activities of BPPs and provides for civil remedies in the event of noncompliance. See
id. § 110.
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this Part discusses how these dynamics affect the need for legal
representation.
A.

Case Representation

To obtain a discharge, a debtor must first commence a bankruptcy
case by filing a petition under the operative chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code pursuant to which the debtor wishes the case to proceed. 23 Relief
under the Code’s operative chapters proceeds according to a basic
principle—the discharge of debt in exchange for the debtor’s assets or
future income. For example, an individual debtor who seeks a Chapter 7
discharge must give up all nonexempt assets, which will be liquidated by
a trustee. 24 The trustee will use the liquidation proceeds to satisfy
creditor claims. 25 If granted a Chapter 7 discharge, the debtor will be
absolved of personal liability for all pre-bankruptcy debts that are
dischargeable. 26 Accordingly, one can conceive of a Chapter 7 debtor’s
fresh start as “the net financial benefit” that results when deducting
(1) the sum of the debtor’s direct costs of filing for bankruptcy (e.g.,
attorneys’ fees and filing fees) and the value of the debtor’s nonexempt
assets from (2) the total amount of discharged debt. 27
Nationwide, Chapter 7 cases routinely account for the majority of
bankruptcy filings by individuals whose debts primarily consist of
consumer debts (“consumer debtors”). 28 For example, Chapter 7 cases
constituted approximately 66% (i.e., 600,885 of 909,812) of all cases
filed by consumer debtors in 2014. 29 Because the Chapter 7 discharge
has greater applicability, the discussion below focuses on substantive
and procedural considerations relating to that discharge.
23. See id. § 301.
24. See id. §§ 522(b)(1), 541(a)(1), 704(a)(1).
25. See id. § 726(a).
26. See id. §§ 523(a), 524(a)(2), 727(b).
27. Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives
Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 700
(1998); cf. Harris v. Viegelahn, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015) (“Chapter 7 allows a
debtor to make a clean break from his financial past, but at a steep price: prompt liquidation of the
debtor’s assets.”).
28. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/R6WXQNU7]. The Bankruptcy Code defines a consumer debt as a “debt incurred by an individual
primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8).
29. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE F-2—U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2014/12/31 [https://perma.cc/ZAY5-GUK7].
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The bankruptcy case itself is an administrative proceeding within
which disputes involving the debtor may, but need not, arise. 30 Although
bankruptcy is formally a judicial process, much of that process
historically has been and continues to be managerial and ministerial in
nature. 31 Because garden-variety Chapter 7 consumer cases are devoid
of litigation (“uncontested cases”), they essentially constitute
transactional work focused on front-end client interviews that generate
the requisite information documented in the disclosure forms that
facilitate entry into the bankruptcy system. 32 Failure to comply with the
Bankruptcy Code’s disclosure requirements can result in dismissal of the
debtor’s case. 33 As such, from a debtor’s perspective, the key task in a
Chapter 7 consumer case is properly filling out forms so as to ensure that
the court seamlessly processes the filing and ultimately grants the debtor
a discharge. 34 This dynamic has been one of the dominant factors that
has shaped the market for legal representation at the point of entry into
the bankruptcy system via Chapter 7.
As a preliminary matter, the stakes of Chapter 7 relief are high from
the debtor perspective. For example, we can roughly estimate that the
average Chapter 7 consumer case filed in 2014 involved approximately

30. See Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 910 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (stating that a
bankruptcy case “serves as the administrative mechanism by which the debtor receives a discharge
and a fresh start” (emphasis added)); In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 353 B.R. 318,
322–23 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (“A ‘case’ refers to a matter initiated by the filing of a petition seeking
relief under the Bankruptcy Code. A ‘proceeding’ refers to everything which happens within the
context of a bankruptcy case.”).
31. See Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV. 963,
965–68 (1993).
32. See, e.g., Va. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1883, at 6 (2015),
https://www.vsb.org/docs/LEO/1883.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PN2E-WP8K].
The
disclosure
requirements are an integral component of bankruptcy as a collective proceeding that aims to
distribute the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors. The marshalling and distribution functions
of such a proceeding can be properly executed only if adequate information exists regarding the
debtor’s financial circumstances (e.g., assets, liabilities, income, and expenses). See Siegel v.
Weldon (In re Weldon), 184 B.R. 710, 715 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995); 1 HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL.,
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.1.1, at 85 (John Rao ed., 9th ed. 2009).
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code has structured a self-reporting system pursuant to which a debtor
must make such disclosures. See 11 U.S.C. § 521.
33. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(e)(2)(B), 521(i)(1), 707(a)(3).
34. See 1 SOMMER, supra note 32, § 7.1.1, at 85; Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee
Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 68, 101 (2012). This is not to say, however,
that a debtor will no longer need the advice of counsel after having filed for bankruptcy relief. See
In re Castorena, 270 B.R. 504, 529 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“To send a debtor into a bankruptcy pro
se, on the theory that he has had ‘enough’ advice and counseling in the document preparation stage
to safely represent himself, is except in the extraordinary case so fundamentally unfair as to amount
to misrepresentation.”).
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$153,607 of dischargeable debt. 35 That is a sizable debt burden when
one considers that $2,413 was the amount of average monthly income
reported in the median Chapter 7 consumer case filed in 2014. 36 It
should go without saying that a debtor with annual income of less than
$30,000 does not have a meaningful prospect of retiring a six-digit debt
load. Wiping out personal liability of this magnitude would make a
world of difference for a low-income debtor. Given that more than
ninety percent of Chapter 7 cases filed by individual debtors have been
no-asset cases (i.e., cases in which the debtor does not have any
nonexempt assets for liquidation and distribution to creditors), 37 for most
Chapter 7 consumer debtors, only the direct costs of filing for
bankruptcy are likely to offset the financial benefit of discharge.38
The question arises as to how individuals who are in dire need of
financial relief can afford representation. Several practical
considerations limit the options available to debtors. First of all, given
that debtors file for bankruptcy to have their debts discharged, the nature
of the relief sought (i.e., injunctive relief) 39 does not generate a monetary
award from which an attorney can carve out a contingent fee. As such,

35. In compiling bankruptcy statistics, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (the “AOUSC”) is required to report “the aggregate amount of debt discharged in
cases filed during the reporting period, determined as the difference between the total amount of
debt and obligations of a debtor reported on the schedules and the amount of such debt reported in
categories which are predominantly nondischargeable.” 28 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)(C) (2012). The
AOUSC refers to this amount as “net scheduled debt” in the table that reports this statistic. See
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BAPCPA TABLE 1A, at 4 n.2 (2014), http://www.uscourts.
gov/statistics/table/bapcpa-1a/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-actbapcpa/2014/12/31 [https://perma.cc/2VAT-HCSH]. In 2014, debtors reported a total amount of
$83,745,558,000 of net scheduled debt in 545,191 Chapter 7 consumer cases with complete
schedules, see id. at 1, for an average amount of $153,607 of net scheduled debt. Again this is a
rough estimate. Due to incomplete schedules, the AOUSC’s statistic for net scheduled debt does not
include data from all filed cases. See id. at 4 n.1. Furthermore, the AOUSC’s reliance on categories
of debt to determine the amount of nondischargeable debts scheduled by debtors can result in both
overinclusion and underinclusion of scheduled debts in the category of nondischargeable debts.
36. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BAPCPA TABLE 2A (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics/table/bapcpa-2a/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-actbapcpa/2014/12/31 [https://perma.cc/ZPG4-6W7K].
37. See, e.g., LOIS R. LUPICA, AM. BANKR. INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BANKR. JUDGES, THE
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CREDITOR DISTRIBUTION STUDY 6 (2013).
38. Recall that the net financial benefit that an individual debtor derives from Chapter 7 discharge
requires deducting (1) the sum of the debtor’s direct costs of filing for bankruptcy (e.g., attorneys’
fees and filing fees) and the value of the debtor’s nonexempt assets from (2) the total amount of
discharged debt. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).
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Chapter 7 debtors generally must pay up-front for legal services, 40 many
of them likely experiencing difficulty in scraping together the funds
needed to do so. 41
Given these economic realities, attorneys are severely constrained in
the amount that they can charge clients to represent them in a Chapter 7
consumer case. For example, from 2003 through 2009, the nationwide
average for attorneys’ fees in no-asset Chapter 7 consumer cases in
which the debtor obtained a discharge did not exceed $1,000 (in 2005
inflation-adjusted dollars). 42 Despite these constraints, attorneys have
made a profit in representing Chapter 7 consumer debtors through the
combination of high volume and low cost. 43 A large swath of Chapter 7
consumer practice has structured itself by implementing routinized
procedures that screen for large numbers of uncontested cases and that
efficiently generate the documentation required for a debtor to overcome
the procedural hurdles faced at the time of filing. 44
We see, then, that uncontested Chapter 7 practice lends itself to an
economy of scale. This, in turn, facilitates a market for legal
representation that ultimately appears to be accessible to many debtors.
For example, from 2007 through 2012, the median and mean selfrepresentation rates in Chapter 7 consumer cases nationwide were,
respectively, 7.4% and 7.5%. 45 In other words, the overwhelming
majority of Chapter 7 consumer debtors find a way to enlist the
assistance of counsel when filing for bankruptcy relief. Importantly,
40. See Robert J. Landry, III & Amy K. Yarbrough, An Empirical Examination of the Direct
Access Costs to Chapter 7 Consumer Bankruptcy: A Pilot Study in the Northern District of
Alabama, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 331, 334 (2008); Lupica, supra note 34, at 105.
41. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289,
318, 322 & n.130 (2010).
42. See Lupica, supra note 34, at 46, 69.
43. See, e.g., In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444, 450 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
44. See Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of the
Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135,
154 (2007); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as
Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397,
406, 409–10 (1994). For such practices, a reduction in filings can have a drastic effect on their
operations. See, e.g., Marilyn Odendahl, Attorneys, Courts Feel Drop in Bankruptcy Filings, THE
IND. LAW. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/attorneys-courts-feel-drop-inbankruptcy-filings/PARAMS/article/39309 [https://perma.cc/YMT9-J2JF] (“At the peak,
Zuckerberg, who has offices around the state, was handling 200 to 300 cases a month. With the
decline, he has laid off attorneys and staff members in 2014 and 2015.”); cf. Lupica, supra note 34,
at 123–24 (“[S]ignificant gross receivables are required to support a law office . . . . [B]ecause
consumer debtors are not likely to be repeat clients . . . lawyers must take affirmative steps to ensure
a steady stream of new clients.” (footnote omitted)).
45. See Pardo, Self-Representation, supra note 4, at 98.
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prior research has suggested that such representation nearly assures that
the debtor’s case will not be dismissed, 46 which is a crucial procedural
hurdle to overcome given that case dismissal will dispositively result in
the debtor’s failure to obtain a discharge.
B.

Representation in Discharge Litigation

For nondismissed Chapter 7 cases, the court must grant the debtor a
discharge unless the debtor falls within a particular class of individual,
usually defined by reference to a limited set of circumstances relating to
the debtor’s fraud or misconduct in connection with the bankruptcy
case. 47 An objection to a Chapter 7 debtor’s discharge must generally be
filed no later than sixty days after the first date set for the meeting of
creditors, 48 which must be set no earlier than twenty-one days and no
later than forty days after the date that the Chapter 7 debtor filed for
bankruptcy. 49 Accordingly, approximately three months after filing for
bankruptcy, a Chapter 7 debtor will likely know whether a discharge will
be forthcoming. 50 Practically speaking, only a small percentage of
Chapter 7 consumer cases result in denial of discharge. 51
The scope of a Chapter 7 discharge does not include all prebankruptcy debts. 52 Presently, the Bankruptcy Code classifies nineteen
types of debts to be excepted from such a discharge, 53 generally on the
basis of either the creditor’s identity (e.g., a domestic support creditor)

46. See id. at 104 tbl.5.3 (reporting dismissal rates for Chapter 7 consumer cases filed in the
Western District of Washington from 2008 through 2012 and finding that the dismissal rate for selfrepresented cases (i.e., 12.96%) was statistically significantly greater than the dismissal rate for
represented cases (i.e., 0.89%)).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012).
48. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). A court, however, may extend for cause the time for filing an
objection to discharge. Id. 4004(b).
49. Id. 2003(a).
50. Upon expiration of the time fixed for objecting to a discharge, the court must grant the debtor
a discharge, unless procedural considerations—such as an extension of the time for filing a
complaint objecting to discharge or a pending motion to dismiss the debtor’s case—warrant
otherwise. See id. 4004(c)(1). The procedural deadline for filing a discharge objection, however, is a
claim-processing rule that the debtor will forfeit if he fails to timely assert it as an affirmative
defense. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456–60 (2004).
51. See, e.g., Lupica, supra note 34, at 68, 138 tbl.A-6 (reporting discharge rates exceeding 90%);
Pardo, Self-Representation, supra note 4, at 95 (“[O]f the 79,649 non-dismissed Chapter 7 cases in
this study, 99.3% resulted in a discharge for the debtor.”).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
53. See id. § 523(a).
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or the circumstances that gave rise to the debt (e.g., an intentional tort).54
With the exception of three types of nondischargeable debt, the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the Bankruptcy Rules) do not impose
any time limit on seeking a determination regarding the dischargeability
of a debt. 55 In fact, the Bankruptcy Rules contemplate the possibility that
such a determination may be sought after the debtor has been granted a
discharge and the case has been closed. 56 Accordingly, the potential for
litigation over the scope of discharge may persist well beyond the
debtor’s exit from bankruptcy.
As previously mentioned, if the facts and circumstances of the
debtor’s case provide a basis for seeking to deny the debtor a discharge
or seeking a determination that a particular debt should be deemed
nondischargeable, the debtor will have to contend with complex and
protracted discharge litigation. The Bankruptcy Rules classify nearly all
proceedings objecting to the debtor’s discharge and all proceedings to
determine the dischargeability of a debt as adversary proceedings.57
Adversary proceedings in bankruptcy are the analogue to nonbankruptcy
federal civil litigation insofar as the Bankruptcy Rules governing such
proceedings virtually incorporate, with occasional modification, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules). 58 As such,
discharge litigation will entail the panoply of procedure that permeates
nonbankruptcy federal civil litigation. 59
The increased procedural complexity and varying substantive
requirements of discharge litigation make debtor representation in this
vein more costly than uncontested case representation. Attorneys are
likely to exclude discharge litigation from the range of services included
in the fee paid by the debtor for case representation.60 As a consequence,
many debtors will have to procure additional funds if they want to enlist

54. See, e.g., Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in AngloAmerican Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 89 n.99 (1982).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b), (c).
56. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
57. Id. 7001(4), (6).
58. See id. pt. VII; Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 457 (2004) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“The similarities between adversary proceedings in bankruptcy and federal civil
litigation are striking. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern adversary proceedings in
substantial part.”).
59. See Christopher M. Klein, Bankruptcy Rules Made Easy (2001): A Guide to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that Apply in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35, 38 (2001).
60. See Landry & Yarbrough, supra note 40, at 334; Gary Neustadter, Randomly Distributed
Trial Court Justice: A Case Study and Siren from the Consumer Bankruptcy World, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 351, 415 n.331 (2016).
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the services of an attorney in discharge litigation, which could be a
struggle even for debtors who have been granted a discharge, but who
subsequently end up litigating over the dischargeability of a debt. 61 Any
amassed funds are likely to be insufficient to pay for more than a
minimal amount of services. 62 Furthermore, if the economics of debtdischargeability litigation discourage many attorneys from representing
debtors in such proceedings, 63 it could be “that the choice of counsel for
debtors will be quite limited and perhaps confined mostly to low-quality
attorneys.” 64 Finally, we can expect that many debtors will simply be
priced out of the market for legal representation and will have to
represent themselves. 65
The perception held by federal court judges of the experience of selfrepresented litigants provides a useful benchmark for thinking about the
difficulties that individual debtors may face in bankruptcy litigation.
Several years ago, the Federal Judicial Center (the “FJC”) conducted a
study that sought feedback from chief judges of the federal district
courts about the challenges presented by self-represented parties in their
courts. 66 In July 2010, the FJC sent questionnaires to the nation’s ninetyfour chief district judges, of whom sixty-one responded (i.e., a response
rate of approximately sixty-five percent). 67 One-half to two-thirds of the
61. Cf. Julapa Jagtiani & Wenli Li, Credit Access After Consumer Bankruptcy Filing: New
Evidence, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 341 (2015) (“[M]ost debtors have much reduced access to credit
after bankruptcy filing, including reduced credit limits. The impact seems to be long lasting, well
beyond the discharge date.” (footnote omitted)).
62. See, e.g., Neustadter, supra note 60, at 412; Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On
Access to Justice, Procedural Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 2101, 2138 (2014) [hereinafter Pardo, Thicket].
63. Cf. Lupica, supra note 34, at 123 (“Many respondents described a disconnect between the
skill, time, and commitment it takes for attorneys to provide debtors with first-rate representation,
and compensation that does not always reflect such excellence.”); Shepherd, supra note 4, at 194
(“High litigation costs make accepting many legitimate cases economically infeasible for contingent
fee attorneys. Unless expected damages are large, the attorneys simply cannot justify accepting
many cases because the expected fees will not offset the high costs of medical malpractice
litigation.”).
64. Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2139; see also Neustadter, supra note 60, at 412 (discussing
the possibility that, in the context of debt-dischargeability litigation, “some attorneys may lack the
degree of knowledge or skill necessary to discover, formulate, or effectively communicate relatively
obscure and complex legal arguments”).
65. See Emery G. Lee III, Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice and the Cost of Legal
Services, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 499, 514–15 (2015).
66. DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES (2011),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/proseusdc.pdf/$file/proseusdc.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7D3
-N4LQ].
67. Id. at 39 n.2.
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respondents “reported that five major issues or conditions are present in
most or all pro se cases,” 68 which the FJC identified as follows:
1. pleadings or submissions that are unnecessary, illegible, or
cannot be understood;
2. problems with pro se litigants’ responses to motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment;
3. pro se litigants’ lack of knowledge about legal decisions or
other information that would help their cases;
4. pro se litigants’ failure to know when to object to testimony
or evidence; and
5. pro se litigants’ failure to understand the legal consequences
of their actions or inactions (e.g., failure to plead statute of
limitation, failure to respond to requests for admissions). 69
On the basis of these survey results, the FJC concluded that,
“[o]verall, pro se litigants appear to have a difficult time presenting the
substance of their cases to the court.” 70
Given the procedural similarities between bankruptcy litigation and
federal nonbankruptcy civil litigation, 71 we should expect selfrepresented debtors in discharge litigation to experience difficulties
similar to those experienced by their nonbankruptcy self-represented
counterparts. For example, consider the following warning that one
bankruptcy judge in a debt-dischargeability determination provided to
the self-represented creditor who had initiated the litigation and had
failed to submit a form of summons for issuance by the court: “The
filing and prosecution of a . . . complaint to determine dischargeability
and the procedures and practice associated with prosecuting such a
complaint are extremely complex. It is difficult to proceed successfully
with such litigation without the help of competent legal counsel.” 72 Selfrepresented debtors have made similar comments in debt-

68. Id. at vii.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
72. Order at 1 n.1, Proctor v. Hegwood (In re Hegwood), Ch. 7 Case No. 14-12682, Adv. No. 141271 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 12, 2014), ECF No. 3. That the warning targeted a self-represented
creditor, rather than a self-represented debtor, should not matter. Both parties must work within the
same procedural framework. Additionally, given that either a debtor or a creditor may initiate a
debt-dischargeability determination, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a), debtors can be plaintiffs in
such proceedings and often are, see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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dischargeability determinations, indicating that procedural complexity
has forced them to give up on vindicating their discharge right. 73
***
In sum, we should expect self-represented debtors to experience
difficulty in vindicating their discharge right as a result of procedural
complexity. The remainder of this Article addresses whether empirical
evidence supports this hypothesis.
II.

EMPIRICALLY EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF
SELF-REPRESENTATION IN DISCHARGE LITIGATION

To test the hypothesis regarding the relationship between the
represented status of a debtor and success in discharge litigation, this
study focuses its investigation on a subset of such litigation—
specifically, adversary proceedings to determine whether an educational
debt was excepted from an individual debtor’s discharge (an
“educational-debt dischargeability determination”). There are several
reasons that motivate this specific approach.
First, confining the empirical investigation to a particular subset of
litigation minimizes concerns over controlling for: (1) differences in the
procedural nature, litigant identity, and subject matter of the various
types of discharge litigation; 74 (2) differences in burdens of proof; 75 and
(3) potential selection effects in the decision to initiate such litigation.76
73. See, e.g., Letter/Motion to Withdraw Complaint Filed by Plaintiff/Debtor, Henry v. Wells
Fargo Bank NA (In re Henry), Ch. 7 Case No. 12-71257, Adv. No. 12-07044 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Oct.
3, 2012), ECF No. 32 (“It is clear to me that I did not understand the complexity of filing an
Adversary Complaint to discharge my student loans when doing so . . . . I did not foresee that the
process would be infinitely more complicated than the filing of the bankruptcy itself. The
documents that have been addressed to me concerning this matter are overwhelming . . . .”).
74. For an example of differences in the procedural nature of debt-dischargeability proceedings,
consider that, for certain types of debts, the debt will be discharged unless the creditor initiates the
proceeding no later than sixty days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors that
Bankruptcy Code § 341(a) requires. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
With the exception of these debts, the Bankruptcy Rules do not impose a deadline for filing a
complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
75. Some debt-dischargeability proceedings involve conditionally dischargeable debts—that is,
debts that are initially excepted from discharge but that nonetheless may be discharged if the debtor
establishes the relevant exception to the exception. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3), (a)(8); Boshkoff,
supra note 54, at 73–74, 89 (discussing conditional discharge rules). These proceedings entail a
bifurcated burden of proof pursuant to which the creditor bears the burden to establish the exception
(i.e., nondischargeability) and the debtor bears the burden to establish the exception to the exception
(i.e., dischargeability). See, e.g., Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 594–95 (1923).
76. For example, because certain debts will be deemed discharged if a creditor fails to initiate a
debt-dischargeability determination during the pendency of the case, see supra note 74, some of
those proceedings may be improvidently commenced merely to preserve the opportunity to argue
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With this approach, the study’s dataset becomes more homogenous,
which in turn ought to make the results more reliable.
Second, focusing on the dynamics of a debt-dischargeability
determination, as opposed to a particular type of discharge objection,
will hopefully provide insights that are farther reaching and thus have
greater relevance to the topic of discharge litigation. Prior research
suggests that, when a Chapter 7 consumer case involves an adversary
proceeding, the proceeding will most likely involve a debtdischargeability determination.77
Third, educational-debt dischargeability determinations “involve a
nontechnical area of bankruptcy law with a minimal role (if any) for
specialized expertise.” 78 As discussed below, such determinations
involve a bifurcated burden of proof. 79 With respect to the creditor’s
burden to establish the nature and amount of the debt, “it would . . . be
fair to characterize the three alternatives for establishing the existence of
an educational debt excepted from discharge as ‘crystalline, highly
specific statutory provisions, [that] while difficult to penetrate, leave
little to the imagination.’” 80 With respect to the debtor’s burden to
establish that repayment of the debt would impose an undue hardship
and thus should be deemed dischargeable, the vague nature of the
standard “invites a court to make a general, nontechnical inquiry into the
level of sacrifice that is expected of debtors and the threshold at which
the sacrifice becomes impermissible.” 81 By focusing on a type of
bankruptcy litigation in which the law will be less complex and
technical, a preliminary baseline explaining litigation success can be
established, and that baseline can be elaborated upon in the future to
further our understanding of litigation success in matters that are more
substantively complex.

that the debt should be deemed nondischargeable, see Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does
Ideology Matter in Bankruptcy? Voting Behavior on the Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 919, 980–81 (2012) [hereinafter Nash & Pardo, Ideology]. If, after the fact, the creditor
decides that its argument is weak or has no merit, the creditor could voluntarily dismiss its
complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041 (incorporating, with some
exceptions, FED. R. CIV. P. 41).
77. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A
Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 957, 959 (2005).
78. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking the Principal-Agent Theory of Judging,
99 IOWA L. REV. 331, 346 (2013) [hereinafter Nash & Pardo, Principal-Agent].
79. See infra Part II.C.3.
80. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2115 (quoting Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in
Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 560 (2001)).
81. See Nash & Pardo, Principal-Agent, supra note 78, at 346.
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Fourth, given that prior research has found a statistically significant
increase in the likelihood of self-representation in Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 consumer cases as a debtor’s educational attainment increases, 82 one
might be concerned that individual debtors who have attained a higher
level of education would also be more likely to attempt selfrepresentation in discharge litigation. If this were so, questions would
arise about the true nature of the observed effect of self-representation
on litigation success. 83 Importantly, prior research suggests that
individuals who have attained at least an undergraduate degree constitute
a greater percentage of bankruptcy debtors who seek to discharge their
educational debt than of debtors in the general bankruptcy population. 84
Accordingly, a focus on educational-debt dischargeability
determinations should minimize educational-attainment differences
between the groups of represented and self-represented debtors, thereby
bolstering the reliability of the study’s results.
Part II.A provides background information on the litigation dynamics
of educational-debt dischargeability determinations. Part II.B sets forth
the design of this empirical study, and Part II.C sets forth summary
statistics and bivariate analyses of the data from the study. Part II.D
reports the findings from a multivariate logistic regression model for
predicting litigation success. Finally, Part II.E interprets these results.

82. See Angela Littwin, The Do-It-Yourself Mirage: Complexity in the Bankruptcy System, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 160 tbl.9.1, 161–62 (Katherine Porter ed.,
2012) (finding a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of self-representation in Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 consumer cases as a debtor’s level of educational attainment increases).
83. Notably, prior research has found that, when controlling for the represented status of a debtor,
no statistically significant association exists between the educational attainment of a consumer
debtor and the outcome of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. See Littwin, supra note 82, at 167.
84. Compare Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 3, at 451–52 (“Of the 259
[educational debt] discharge determinations reporting sufficiently detailed information on the
debtor’s level of educational attainment . . . , approximately 39% involved debtors who had
obtained an advanced degree [and] . . . 35% involved debtors who had obtained an undergraduate
degree . . . .” (footnotes omitted)), and Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan
Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 204 tbl.1 (2009)
[hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Discharge Litigation] (reporting that, of the forty-five educational-debt
dischargeability determinations providing sufficiently detailed information on the debtor’s level of
educational attainment, approximately 58% involved debtors who had obtained an advanced
degree), with Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE,
supra note 82, at 85–86 (“In 2007, 58.9 percent of bankrupt debtors had attended college. However,
three-quarters of these college efforts did not result in a bachelor’s degree.”).
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The Dynamics of Educational-Debt Dischargeability
Determinations

Outstanding educational debt currently exceeds $1 trillion and
constitutes the largest category of nonmortgage debt (e.g., credit card
accounts and auto loans) owed by consumers. 85 One of the enduring
fault lines of the policy on student-loan repayment has been whether
such debt should be discharged in bankruptcy. Since 1977, rather than
being automatically discharged, educational debt has been conditionally
dischargeable in bankruptcy, 86 requiring the debtor to establish the
applicable condition for the debt to be deemed dischargeable.87 Over
time, Congress has repeatedly made it more difficult for debtors to
obtain a discharge of educational debt in bankruptcy, by either
expanding the category of debts that qualify as educational debts or
limiting the conditions under which such debts may be discharged. 88
The two most recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in this vein
occurred in 1998 and 2005. In 1998, Congress limited a debtor’s basis
for bankruptcy relief from educational debt to a single condition: 89
establishing that excepting the debt from discharge “would impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 90 In 2005,
Congress expanded the category of excepted educational debt—which
already encompassed federal student loans—to include private student
loans. 91
Debtors must litigate their eligibility for forgiveness of educational
debt—specifically, by demonstrating that undue hardship will result
85. See Consumer Credit – G.19 Current Release, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS. (June 7, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/ [https://perma.cc/DUK9RS4E]; Consumer Credit – G.19 About, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 7,
2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/about.htm [https://perma.cc/JDN9-AACK].
86. Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 3, at 420–22 (discussing section 439A of the
Education Amendments of 1976 and its delayed effective date).
87. See supra note 75.
88. Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 3, at 427 & n.116.
89. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 1581, 1837
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). Before 1998, debtors could also seek to have their student loans
discharged in bankruptcy on the basis that the loans had been due and owing for a certain period of
time prior to the bankruptcy filing—initially a five-year period that Congress subsequently extended
to a seven-year period. See Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 3, at 420–21, 434 n.140.
91. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)). In using the phrase “private student
loan,” this Article specifically refers to “a qualified educational loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8)(B).
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from the continued obligation to repay the debt. 92 The legal framework’s
attendant procedures and burdens of proof create access-to-justice
barriers for debtors that tilt the scales in favor of their student-loan
creditors. 93
Because of the inherent complexity of the procedural framework for
obtaining a discharge of educational debt through bankruptcy, the
litigation costs for debtors are likely to be quite substantial,94 with “fees
[that] can easily mount in the thousands and tens of thousands of
dollars.” 95 These costs adversely affect the ability of debtors, who have
filed for bankruptcy because of financial distress, to vindicate their
undue hardship claims. In essence, debtors without the means to hire an
attorney are confronted with one of two stark choices: selfrepresentation or giving up any attempt to seek an undue hardship
determination. 96
In light of these considerations, it is expected that represented debtors
will be more likely to experience litigation success in this context than
self-represented debtors. If such evidence exists, then a key focus of the
debate over the dischargeability of educational debt in bankruptcy
should be about how debtors may attain unfettered access to their
“statutory right to an undue hardship determination.” 97 As a descriptive
matter, no one can dispute that debtors who would suffer undue hardship
if required to repay their student loans are entitled to relief.98 That is the

92. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 268–69 (2010) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Rules require a party seeking to
determine the dischargeability of a student loan debt to commence an adversary proceeding by
serving a summons and complaint on affected creditors.”).
93. Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2106–21.
94. Id. at 2137–39; cf., e.g., Consent to Discharge Loan Owed to Educational Credit Management
Corporation ¶¶ 7–8, Coffee v. Nat’l Student Loans (In re Coffee), Ch. 7 Case No. 07-12822, Adv.
No. 11-01037 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 2, 2012), ECF No. 11 (“[T]he unpaid balance on the Note is
$7,616.61 . . . . ECMC states that Plaintiff’s Note is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) as
the cost of defense of this litigation will likely exceed the loan balance.”).
95. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE TRUTH ABOUT STUDENT LOANS AND THE UNDUE
HARDSHIP DISCHARGE 3 (2013), http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/iulianoresponse.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ5R-2RX8].
96. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 65 ll. 19–23, Murphy v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Murphy),
Ch. 7 Case No. 11-19098, Adv. No. 12-01003 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 23, 2013), ECF No. 123
(“People that are a lot worse than I am wouldn’t have even contemplated doing this, I don’t think.
They couldn’t—certainly couldn’t afford an attorney. I couldn’t afford an attorney. That’s the
reason I did it myself.”).
97. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 454 (2004).
98. Such a proposition is, of course, subject to normative debate. It should be noted, however,
that ever since student loans lost their automatically dischargeable status in bankruptcy and became
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state of the law. But if undue hardship debtors cannot successfully
navigate a highly technical and complex legal process because of lack of
representation, and thus fail to vindicate their statutory entitlement to
relief, then policymakers need to refocus their efforts to reformulating
the process so that it eliminates the access-to-justice barriers that inhere
in the current legal framework. Without doing so, the law will
inexorably continue to create false hope.
B.

Study Design

This project utilizes an original dataset of adversary proceedings to
determine the dischargeability of educational debt commenced in any
U.S. bankruptcy court during the 2011 and 2012 calendar years.99 The
dataset consists of 1,430 such proceedings (the “Study Population”). 100
Additionally, to explore in greater detail the nature and role of legal
representation in such proceedings, a random sample of 395 adversary
proceedings (the “Representative Sample”) was drawn from the Study
Population. Notably, the Study Population consists of some adversary
proceedings that were filed in the same underlying bankruptcy case. 101
In order to avoid including multiple adversary proceedings from the
same underlying bankruptcy case in the Representative Sample, the
sample was drawn so that every bankruptcy case number appearing in
the sample would appear only once for a given federal judicial district.
Put another way, the Representative Sample does not consist of multiple

conditionally dischargeable, no major reform effort has been undertaken to make student loans
unconditionally nondischargeable in bankruptcy. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2174–75.
99. For details on the process used to identify adversary proceedings for inclusion in the dataset,
see Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, 2146–48. Every federal judicial district in the fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, of which there are ninety-one, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 81–131
(2012), has a bankruptcy court, see id. § 152. Bankruptcy judges have the authority to “hear and
determine” all core proceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code, id. § 157(b)(1), which
include “determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts,” id. § 157(b)(2)(I).
100. A prior project utilizing a subset of these data reported that the entire dataset consisted of
1,439 such proceedings. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2148. Continuing work with the
dataset for this current project revealed that some of the 1,439 proceedings involved erroneously
filed complaints. The clerk’s office for the court in which such a complaint was filed would
designate the corresponding adversary proceeding as having been opened in error and would close
the proceeding, with no other docket activity (e.g., the issuance of a summons) having occurred.
See, e.g., Haueter v. Sallie Mae (In re Haueter), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-25837, Adv. No. 11-01516
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. opened Dec. 27, 2011 and closed Jan. 9, 2012). These erroneously opened
proceedings have been omitted from the dataset, thus resulting in an updated dataset consisting of
1,430 proceedings. The subset of the data used in the prior project did not include any of the
erroneously opened proceedings.
101. See infra Appendix Table A1.
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adversary proceedings that were filed in the same underlying bankruptcy
case, thus ensuring that each debtor in the Representative Sample is
unique. Table A2 of the Appendix sets forth a comparison of the Study
Population to the Representative Sample.
C.

Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses

This Section provides descriptive statistics of the current study’s data
and discusses bivariate analyses that explore correlations between the
outcome of an adversary proceeding and various explanatory variables
of interest.
1.

Debtor Litigation Success

By commencing an educational-debt dischargeability determination, a
debtor signals a desire to obtain relief from such debt through the
bankruptcy process. 102 As a preliminary matter, such an adversary
proceeding essentially entails a request for a declaratory judgment
specifying whether the discharge order entered in the debtor’s
bankruptcy case included the educational debt at issue. 103 Although
debtors and creditors have equal opportunity to commence such
proceedings, 104 debtors are nearly always the party who appears as the
plaintiff in this context. For example, based on the observations in the
Representative Sample, it is estimated that debtors commenced 99.0%
[97.3, 99.7] of the adversary proceedings in the Study Population. 105

102. In creditor-initiated proceedings, one would expect debtors to defend on the basis that either:
(1) the debt does not qualify as a type of educational debt excepted from discharge; or (2) the
educational debt would impose an undue hardship on the debtor if deemed nondischargeable. See
Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2110–21 (discussing burdens of proof in educational-debt
dischargeability determinations). Prevailing on either defense would mean that the debt was
dischargeable, thus resulting in relief from the debt through the bankruptcy process. Accordingly,
the incentives of debtors in creditor-initiated proceedings should be similar in most instances to the
incentives of debtors in debtor-initiated proceedings. For further discussion regarding the
assessments that drive the decision to pursue debt-dischargeability litigation, see Pardo & Lacey,
Discharge Litigation, supra note 84, at 189.
103. See O’Brien v. First Marblehead Educ. Res., Inc. (In re O’Brien), 419 F.3d 104, 105 (2d Cir.
2005) (per curiam); Keenom v. All Am. Mktg. (In re Keenom), 231 B.R. 116, 125 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1999); In re Anderson, 72 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
104. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a) (“A debtor or any creditor may file a complaint to obtain a
determination of the dischargeability of any debt.”).
105. This Article uses the notation [#, #] to indicate the lower and upper bounds of the ninetyfive-percent confidence interval for estimates. When making estimates of proportions in the Study
Population based on observations from the Representative Sample, this Article follows the
recommendation to use (1) the Wilson interval for estimates based on forty observations or less; and
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Accordingly, for ease of exposition, this Article orients discussion of the
litigation process from the vantage of debtor-initiated proceedings.
Given the core inquiry of this study to determine whether legal
representation has an effect on a debtor’s ability to obtain relief from his
educational debt through the bankruptcy litigation process, an important
task is defining when a debtor ought to be deemed to have obtained such
relief. As the following considerations suggest, this is a nuanced task
requiring careful discernment informed by the research question.
There are, of course, a variety of procedural mechanisms for a debtor
to obtain relief in an adversary proceeding—for example, default
judgment, summary judgment, or trial judgment. But some of these
victories may prove hollow—for example, if the debtor obtains a default
judgment against the wrong party 106—or short-lived—for example, if an
appellate court reverses a trial judgment in favor of the debtor. On the
other hand, while the dismissal of a debtor-initiated adversary
proceeding will not confer any bankruptcy relief on the debtor, 107 the
possibility exists that the debtor may nonetheless obtain nonbankruptcy
relief from his educational debt (e.g., enrollment in an incomecontingent repayment program or an administrative discharge) and in
fact may have sought a voluntary dismissal of his proceeding toward this
end. 108
Adding yet another wrinkle, the debtor and creditor could settle the
matter, agreeing that the debtor is entitled to relief (or not). Importantly,
unlike other areas of law where settlement usually occurs in private and
the terms agreed to by the parties remain undisclosed to the public, all
but two of the settled proceedings in the Study Population included a
written stipulation by the litigants setting forth the terms of their
settlement. 109 In such instances, the bankruptcy court entered an order in
accordance with the stipulation, and that order constituted the judgment
of the court. Accordingly, this study has been able to document the

(2) the Agresti-Coull interval for estimates based on more than forty observations. See Lawrence D.
Brown et al., Interval Estimation for a Binomial Proportion, 16 STAT. SCI. 101, 115 (2001).
106. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2131–32, 2132 n.199.
107. In a creditor-initiated proceeding, an involuntary dismissal would result in relief for the
debtor given that such a dismissal usually “operates as an adjudication on the merits.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 41(b); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041 (incorporating, with some exceptions, FED. R. CIV. P.
41).
108. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2131 & n.193.
109. For further discussion on bankruptcy settlements, see generally Reynaldo Anaya Valencia,
The Sanctity of Settlements and the Significance of Court Approval: Discerning Clarity from
Bankruptcy Rule 9019, 78 OR. L. REV. 425 (1999).
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substantive outcome for nearly every settled adversary proceeding in the
Study Population.
In light of these considerations, how should a coding protocol define
litigation success for purposes of the research question at hand? To
explore the effect of self-representation in educational-debt
dischargeability determinations, this study’s dependent variable focuses
on whether the debtor obtained within the adversary proceeding any
relief from educational debt, regardless of the procedural avenue
pursuant to which the court granted such relief. Provided that the court
entered any order granting some relief to the debtor, no matter how
generous (e.g., full discharge) or meager (e.g., forbearance or reduction
of interest), and regardless of whether it was hollow or short-lived, the
study classified the adversary proceeding as one involving litigation
success for the debtor. For the couple of settled proceedings in which the
parties did not disclose their settlement terms, the study classified the
proceeding as not involving bankruptcy litigation success given that the
court order did not adopt the settlement terms. 110
On the other hand, the study classified any dismissed proceeding as
not involving litigation success, including dismissals that the debtor
requested in order to pursue nonbankruptcy relief or as a result of having
obtained nonbankruptcy relief. In such instances, the bankruptcy court
itself did not grant any debt relief, and so it cannot be said that the debtor
experienced success in using the mandatory litigation process for
obtaining bankruptcy relief from such debt. 111
110. See Agreed Order of Settlement, Rust v. Student Loan Xpress, Inc. (In re Rust), Ch. 7 Case
No. 11-40833, Adv. No. 11-4030 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2012), ECF No. 34 (“Upon agreement
of the parties, . . . this Judgment is entered which settles and compromises all claims with prejudice
pursuant to the terms of a confidential settlement reached by the parties.”); Order re Stipulation to
Dismiss Complaint Without Prejudice, Dang v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Dang), Ch. 7 Case
No. 10-28221, Adv. No. 11-01124 (Bankr. D. Nev. Nov. 2, 2011), ECF No. 13.
111. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 263 (2010) (stating that
“[b]ankruptcy courts must make th[e] undue hardship determination in an adversary proceeding”). It
might be argued that initiating the bankruptcy litigation process may have given the debtor some
leverage in obtaining nonbankruptcy relief, and thus that one should consider such a voluntary
dismissal as a success in using the bankruptcy litigation process to obtain debt relief.
Nonbankruptcy remedies, however, are available to borrowers of federal student loans without the
need to resort to bankruptcy litigation. Moreover, such litigation can impede the debtor from
obtaining nonbankruptcy relief. For example, stipulations in support of voluntary dismissals to
pursue nonbankruptcy administrative remedies often aver that the U.S. Department of Education
will not consider granting administrative relief while the adversary proceeding is pending. See, e.g.,
Stipulation to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Without Prejudice ¶ 2, Marek v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Marek), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-32555, Adv. No. 11-03177 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 4,
2012), ECF No. 40 (“ECMC has informed Plaintiff that, for administrative reasons, this adversary
proceeding must be dismissed to allow for the original lender of Plaintiff’s student loans to
repurchase same and to facilitate consideration of the repayment plan application by the lender/the
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This study has intentionally implemented a broad coding protocol that
sets the bar quite low for what constitutes litigation success. Prior
research has documented that self-represented debtors in bankruptcy
experience less success than their represented counterparts when
attempting to navigate the procedural barriers present at the outset of a
bankruptcy case. 112 If we expect that self-represented debtors are more
likely to commit the procedural errors that lead to hollow or short-lived
victories, and if those victories are not counted as litigation successes,
the concern arises that such a coding protocol could skew results toward
a finding that self-represented status has a negative effect on
experiencing litigation success. Thus, this study looks to err on the side
of caution by using a coding protocol that will likely understate any
correlation between the represented status of the debtor and litigation
success.
Pursuant to these coding protocols, approximately 39.0% (555 of
1,424) of the adversary proceedings in the Study Population involved
litigation success for the debtor. 113
2.

Debtor Representation

Approximately 65.2% (932 of 1,430) of the adversary proceedings in
the Study Population involved a debtor who was represented by counsel
during the entirety of the proceeding, and approximately 2.3% (33 of
1,430) of the proceedings involved a debtor who had representation for
part, but not all, of the proceeding. The remaining 32.5% (465 of 1,430)
of the proceedings involved debtors who did not have any formal
representation whatsoever during the proceeding. 114

U.S. Department of Education.”). Accordingly, it is not readily apparent that a debtor can obtain
leverage through the bankruptcy process that would facilitate the granting of nonbankruptcy relief.
112. See Pardo, Self-Representation, supra note 4, at 105–06; Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical
Examination of Access to Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 27–31
(2009) [hereinafter Pardo, Access].
113. For an explanation of those observations for which there were missing values, see infra
notes 307–08.
114. The possibility exists, however, that some of these debtors may have had undisclosed
assistance of counsel. For example, in an appeal of an educational-debt dischargeability
determination, the federal district court noted that the appellant, a self-represented debtor, “was
utilizing the services of a ghost writer for many of her filings.” Greene v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Civ.
No. 4:13cv79, 2013 WL 5503086, at *10 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d per curiam, 573 F. App’x
300 (4th Cir. 2014). While it is unclear whether the debtor had such assistance while litigating her
adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court in Greene observed “that Ms. Greene’s pleadings,
including her twenty-four (24) page Brief and thirty-two (32) page Reply Brief, are extremely welldrafted, particularly for an unrepresented litigant.” Greene v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Greene),
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In the absence of a relationship between the represented status of the
debtor and litigation success for the debtor, one would expect debtors in
the Study Population to experience litigation success approximately
39.0% of the time—that is, the proportion of adversary proceedings in
the Study Population involving litigation success. 115 For adversary
proceedings involving debtors who were fully self-represented, however,
debtors experienced litigation success only 26.8% of the time. In stark
contrast, for adversary proceedings involving debtors with representation
(i.e., debtors who had either partial or complete representation), such
debtors experienced litigation success 44.8% of the time. A chi-square
test with one degree of freedom indicates that the difference between the
observed and expected values is statistically significant (p < 0.0001). 116
3.

Legal Doctrine

In an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of
educational debt, the creditor “has the initial burden to establish the
existence of the debt and that the debt is an educational loan within the
[Bankruptcy Code’s] parameters.” 117 If the creditor satisfies its burden of
proof, then the burden shifts to the debtor to establish that the debt is
dischargeable on the basis of undue hardship. 118 Specifically, the debtor
must prove that the debt “would impose an undue hardship on the debtor
and the debtor’s dependents” if excepted from discharge. 119 In theory,
the debtor could prevail in such an adversary proceeding by challenging
the creditor’s prima facie case—that is, arguing that the debt at issue
does not fall within one of the categories of educational debt that are
excepted from discharge in the absence of a finding of undue
hardship. 120 The reality, however, is that debtors rarely make such

484 B.R. 98, 107 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) (emphasis added), aff’d, Greene, 2013 WL 5503086. The
Greene adversary proceeding appears in the Study Population, but not in the Representative Sample.
115. See supra text accompanying note 113.
116. This Article uses the level of p ≤ 0.05 to assess statistical significance.
117. Roth v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Roth), 490 B.R. 908, 916 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013);
see also Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Savage (In re Savage), 311 B.R. 835, 839 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2004) (“The creditor bears the initial burden of proving the debt exists and that the debt is of the
type excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8).”); Rumer v. Am. Educ. Servs. (In re Rumer), 469
B.R. 553, 561–63 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012) (“The cases interpreting § 523(a)(8) have held that the
initial burden is on the lender to establish the existence of the debt and to demonstrate that the debt
is included in one of the four categories enumerated in § 523(a)(8).”).
118. E.g., In re Savage, 311 B.R. at 839.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
120. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2114–15 & n.79.
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challenges, 121 with the result that the litigation usually focuses on the
issue of undue hardship. Accordingly, in exploring the determinants of
litigation success in such proceedings, the study controls for the
doctrinal framework applied to decide that issue.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define the phrase “undue hardship.” 122
Courts have filled this statutory gap by adopting one of two judicial
tests: (1) the test established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services
Corp. 123 (the “Brunner test”), and (2) the totality-of-the-circumstances
test established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (the
“totality test”). 124
The Brunner test is a three-prong test that requires a debtor to
establish:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts
to repay the loans. 125
On the other hand, the totality test requires consideration of “(1) the
debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources;
(2) a calculation of the debtor’s and her dependent’s reasonable
necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and
circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.” 126
Outside of the First and Eighth Circuits, courts apply the Brunner test
to analyze a debtor’s claim of undue hardship. 127 Within the First
Circuit, courts apply the totality test, with the exception of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire, which applies the

121. See id. at 2115 & n.82.
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 101.
123. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
124. For a discussion on the origins of the totality test, see Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts,
supra note 3, at 488 n.348.
125. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
126. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003).
127. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2121.
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Brunner test. 128 And, as previously mentioned, courts in the Eighth
Circuit apply the totality test. 129
Approximately 88.4% (1,264 of 1,430) of the adversary proceedings
in the Study Population were commenced in jurisdictions that apply the
Brunner test. 130 As before, in the absence of a relationship between the
law of the jurisdiction and litigation success for the debtor, one would
expect debtors in the Study Population to experience litigation success
approximately 39.0% of the time. The data reveal that debtors
experienced litigation success 38.8% of the time in Brunner jurisdictions
and 40.6% of the time in totality jurisdictions. A chi-square test with one
degree of freedom indicates that the difference between the observed and
expected values is not statistically significant (p = 0.648).
4.

Financial Characteristics

At its essence, deciding the merits of a debtor’s claim of undue
hardship requires a court to evaluate the economic effect on the debtor if
the court determines the educational debt to be nondischargeable.131 A
debtor who files for bankruptcy must file a variety of financial
disclosures, including schedules of assets, liabilities, current income, and
current expenditures. 132 Such information has been deemed relevant in
evaluating a debtor’s claim of undue hardship. 133 Importantly, however,
128. Id.
129. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. When recently presented with the opportunity to
clarify the meaning of undue hardship, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 803 (2016) (No. 15-485), 2015 WL 6083507, the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to do so, see Tetzlaff, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 803.
130. For further detail regarding the geographic distribution of the adversary proceedings in the
Study Population, see infra Appendix Table A2.
131. See, e.g., Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 800
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010) (“Irrespective of the test, the decision of a bankruptcy court, whether the
failure to discharge a student loan will cause undue hardship to the debtor . . . , rests on both the
economic ability to repay and the existence of any disqualifying action(s).”); Weir v. Paige (In re
Weir), 296 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (“Regardless of the test used in determining
whether repayment of student loans constitutes undue hardship . . . , at a minimum the court must
focus on two issues: (1) the economic prospects of the debtor and (2) whether the conduct of the
debtor disqualifies the debtor from taking advantage of the exception.”).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(1)(A), (B). The abovereferenced schedules must be filed no later than fourteen days after the debtor has commenced the
bankruptcy case, unless the court provides the debtor with an extension of time for cause shown.
See id. 1007(c).
133. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1112–13 (9th
Cir. 1998); Greene v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Greene), 484 B.R. 98, 107 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2012); Roundtree-Crawley v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421, 436 n.15
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011); Anelli v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Anelli), 262 B.R. 1, 9–10
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the Bankruptcy Rules provide that a complaint to obtain a
dischargeability determination “may be filed at any time,” including
after the debtor has been granted a discharge and the case has been
closed. 134 Given the potential time lag between the commencement of a
bankruptcy case and the commencement of an adversary proceeding,
courts have also taken the view that events and circumstances
subsequent to the commencement of the case are relevant in evaluating a
debtor’s undue hardship claim. 135 Relatedly, prior research has
demonstrated how the financial situation for certain debtors can worsen
over the period of time between the commencement of the case and the
commencement of the adversary proceeding. 136
To control for the merits of a debtor’s claim of undue hardship, the
study tracked the amounts that debtors in the Representative Sample
reported in the schedules of assets, liabilities, debts, current income, and
current expenses that they filed in their bankruptcy cases. 137 Recognizing
that the financial situation of such debtors could fluctuate between the
commencement of the case and the commencement of the adversary
proceeding, this study controls for the number of days between the two
dates. 138 Finally, in addition to the financial data obtained from the selfreported information provided by the debtors in their schedules, the
following financial characteristics have been calculated using those data:
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000); Brown v. USA Group Loan Servs. (In re Brown), 234 B.R. 104, 106
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999).
134. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b).
135. See, e.g., Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th
Cir. 2011); In re Pena, 155 F.3d at 1112–13; Bronsdon, 435 B.R. at 800.
136. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2127.
137. Because these amounts are self-reported, valid concerns exist regarding the accuracy and
completeness of the data. See Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of Consumer Bankruptcy
Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 653 (1999) (analyzing a random sample of two hundred consumer
bankruptcy cases commenced during the first half of 1998 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan and documenting errors in and omissions of some of the information
provided by debtors in their financial disclosures). That said, debtors have a strong incentive to
ensure the accuracy of their schedules given that they are likely to be questioned under oath at the
meeting of creditors, see 11 U.S.C. § 343, about the information they have provided. See, e.g.,
United States v. Naegele, 341 B.R. 349, 352 (D.D.C. 2006). Depending on the circumstances,
debtors who provide inaccurate information in their schedules may be denied a discharge, see 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), or may face criminal penalties, see 18 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (2012). For these
(and other) reasons, researchers have deemed such data to be a valuable source of information for
studying the consumer bankruptcy system. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the
Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
375, 383 (2001) (“Despite these difficulties of interpretation, however, petition data have the
advantage of being filed under penalty of perjury and of being public data that are relatively easy to
locate and to sample in a valid way.” (footnote omitted)).
138. See infra Part II.B.6.
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(1) the debtor’s monthly disposable household income, measured as the
difference between the debtor’s monthly household income and
expenses on a debtor-by-debtor basis; (2) the ratio of the debtor’s
educational debt to his total debt; and (3) the number of years’ worth of
household income that the debtor would have had to devote to fully
repay his educational debt, measured by the ratio of such debt to the
debtor’s annual household income. Table A1 in the Appendix sets forth
these characteristics with all figures adjusted to 2014 dollars. 139
The financial characteristics indicate the magnitude of hardship faced
by debtors in the Study Population at the time that they filed for
bankruptcy, which, as a general matter, was before they subsequently
sought relief from their educational debt pursuant to a dischargeability
determination commenced either in 2011 or in 2012. 140 Consider, for
example, some of the following characteristics (in 2014 dollars) that
have been estimated for the median debtor in the Study Population based
on the financial profile of the median debtor in the Representative
Sample. With monthly household income of approximately $1,924
[1,797, 2,040], 141 the median debtor would be hard-pressed to make
daily ends meet. The disposable income data further reinforce this point.
After accounting for monthly household expenses, the household of the
median debtor operated at a monthly deficit of $61 [5, 108]. 142 In other
words, the median debtor household did not likely have excess income
to make meaningful payments toward the debtor’s educational debt,
which for the median debtor amounted to $59,315 [48,722, 64,977] and
constituted approximately 41% [37, 47] of the debtor’s total household
debt. 143 Furthermore, the median debtor would have had to devote
approximately 2.3 [2.0, 2.7] years’ worth of annual household income to
repay his educational debt in full—assuming, of course, that the amount
of debt would not increase by virtue of interest or other charges and that

139. See The Cost of Living Calculator, AM. INST. FOR ECON. RES., https://www.aier.org/costliving-calculator [https://perma.cc/Y3LK-JW74].
140. See infra Part II.B.6.
141. See infra Appendix Table A4.
142. See id. Some debtors in the Representative Sample included their monthly student loan
payments in their schedule of current expenses. See, e.g., Schedule J l. 13.c, In re Cummins, Ch. 7
Case No. 11-26242 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 6 (reporting monthly payment of
$98.00 for student loans). Because most debtors did not include such payments in their expense
schedule, the reported deficit of monthly disposable household income understates the extent to
which the debtor’s household operated at a deficit. In other words, if all debtors had included their
monthly student-loan payments in their expense schedule, the reported amount of monthly
disposable household income would have been much lower.
143. See infra Appendix Table A4.
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the debtor’s household could live expense free during this period of
time. 144 Simply put, the median debtor was in horrible financial shape at
the time he filed for bankruptcy.
As set forth in Table A5 of the Appendix, according to a series of
two-sided nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, no statistically
significant association exists between the financial characteristics of
debtors in this study and litigation success.
5.

Creditor Identity

Federal student debt constitutes the overwhelming majority of the
total amount of outstanding student debt. For example, as of the end of
2011 (i.e., one of the calendar years included within this study),
outstanding student debt totaled approximately $1 trillion, of which
$843 billion was federal student debt and an estimated $150 billion was
private student debt. 145 In an adversary proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of federal student debt, one of two litigants will usually
appear to contest the dischargeability of the debt: (1) the U.S.
Department of Education (the “DOE”); and (2) Educational Credit
Management Corporation (“ECMC”), 146 whom the DOE has tasked to
represent the federal interest in bankruptcy litigation involving federally
guaranteed student loans. 147 According to prior research, the
involvement of these creditors in such adversary proceedings has been
statistically significantly associated with the outcome of the
proceedings. 148
For the Study Population, approximately 65.1% of the adversary
proceedings involved an appearance either by the DOE, ECMC, or both

144. See id.
145. Rhoit Chopra, CFPB, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion (Jul. 17,
2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-atrillion/ [https://perma.cc/38ER-SWE6]; see also CFPB, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS 9 (2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4J3-QA6G] (stating that private student loans “make up less than 15% of total
student debt outstanding as of January 1, 2012”).
146. See, e.g., Pardo & Lacey, Discharge Litigation, supra note 102, at 209.
147. For a more comprehensive description of the relationship between the DOE and ECMC, see
Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2143–46. The U.S. government ceased originating federally
guaranteed student loans in July 2010. Id. at 2130 n.182. As of September 30, 2015, the outstanding
balance of federally guaranteed student loans was $134.7 billion. See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 31 (2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/
2015report/fsa-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PX8-G9AB].
148. See, e.g., Pardo & Lacey, Discharge Litigation, supra note 102, at 219–20.
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parties. 149 Once again, in the absence of a relationship between the
appearance of either of these litigants, one would expect debtors in the
Study Population to experience litigation success approximately 39.0%
of the time. The data reveal that debtors experienced litigation success
38.2% of the time in proceedings in which the DOE appeared and 39.4%
of the time in proceedings in which the DOE did not appear. A chisquare test with one degree of freedom indicates that the difference
between the observed and expected values is not statistically significant
(p = 0.651).
On the other hand, debtors experienced litigation success 35.2% of
the time in proceedings involving ECMC’s appearance, as opposed to a
success rate of 41.2% for debtors whose proceedings did not involve
ECMC’s appearance. According to a chi-square test with one degree of
freedom, the difference between the observed and expected values is
statistically significant (p = 0.014).
6.

Adversary Proceeding Characteristics

In order to control for the complexity of the adversary proceeding, the
study coded: (1) the duration of the proceeding, measured as the number
of days from the date that the debtor commenced the adversary
proceeding to the date that the bankruptcy court entered its last order in
the proceeding; (2) the number of documents filed in the proceeding
(whether by a litigant or the court); and (3) whether a trial was held in
the proceeding. In order to account for the fact that the financial
situation of such debtors could fluctuate between the commencement of
the case and the commencement of the adversary proceeding, 150 this
study also controls for the number of days between the two dates.
Finally, the study controls for the calendar year in which the adversary
proceeding was commenced.
For the adversary proceedings of the Study Population, the median
and mean proceeding durations were, respectively, 244 days and 291
days; 151 the median and mean number of filed documents were,

149. More specifically, for the proceedings in the Study Population, approximately (1) 23.9%
(341 of 1,426) involved an appearance by the DOE, but not ECMC; (2) 29.5% (421 of 1,426)
involved an appearance by ECMC, but not the DOE; and (3) 11.7% (167 of 1,426) involved an
appearance by the DOE and ECMC.
150. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
151. See infra Appendix Table A2. The study was able to code the duration of the adversary
proceeding for 1,415 of the 1,430 observations in the Study Population. See id.
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respectively, twenty-three documents and thirty documents; 152 and the
median and mean delays between the commencement of the bankruptcy
case and the adversary proceeding were estimated to be, respectively, 92
[90, 96] days and 257 [189, 345] days. 153 Approximately 6.8% of the
adversary proceedings in the Study Population resulted in a trial, 154 and
approximately 53.5% of the proceedings were commenced during the
2012 calendar year.
Of these variables, only the number of documents filed in the
adversary proceeding is statistically significantly associated with
litigation success. 155 For the group of debtors in the Study Population
who did not experience litigation success, the median and mean number
of documents filed were, respectively, twenty-two documents and
twenty-seven documents. On the other hand, for the group of debtors in
the Study Population who experienced litigation success, the median and
mean number of documents filed were, respectively, twenty-seven
documents and thirty-four documents. According to a two-sided,
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test, there is less than a 0.0001
probability that random chance alone would have yielded differences
this large across the two groups. 156
D.

Modeling Debtor Litigation Success

This Section provides an analysis of the determinants of bankruptcy
litigation success in educational-debt dischargeability determinations by
fitting a logistic regression model. For all dichotomous variables in the
model, negative responses are coded as 0, and positive responses are
coded as 1. The dependent variable is whether the debtor experienced
litigation success (Debtor Litigation Success). 157 The model controls for
the following factors:

152. See id. The study was able to code the number of filed documents for 1,426 of the 1,430
observations in the Study Population. See id.
153. The study coded the time lag between the commencement of the case and the adversary
proceeding only for the Representative Sample. Accordingly, the delay figures that have been
reported are estimates for the Study Population based on the observations in the Representative
Sample. Confidence intervals have therefore been reported for those figures. The study was able to
code the time lag for all 395 observations in the Representative Sample.
154. The study was able to code whether a trial occurred for 1,426 of the 1,430 observations in
the Study Population.
155. See infra Appendix Tables A6, A7.
156. See infra Appendix Table A6.
157. See supra Part II.B.1.
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•

whether the debtor was fully self-represented (Fully SelfRepresented);
• whether the litigation occurred in a jurisdiction in which the
Brunner test is the governing legal standard for undue
hardship (Brunner Jursidiction);
• whether ECMC made an appearance in the adversary
proceeding (ECMC Appearance);
• whether the DOE made an appearance in the adversary
proceeding (DOE Appearance);
• the duration of the adversary proceeding in days (Duration);
• the number of documents filed in the adversary proceeding
(Filed Documents);
• the ratio of (1) the debtor’s amount of educational debt at the
time that the debtor filed his bankruptcy case to (2) the
debtor’s annual household income (Educational-Debt-toIncome Ratio);
• the number of days between the bankruptcy filing and the
commencement of the adversary proceeding (Commencement
Delay);
• whether a trial was held (Trial); and
• whether the adversary proceeding was commenced in 2012
(2012 Proceeding).
Overall, the model is statistically significant as compared to a model
without independent variables. To assess model fit, the observed and
predicted values for litigation success were compared. Using the model
equation, the predicted probability of Litigation Success was calculated
for each observation in the model given the actual value of the
independent variables for that observation. The predicted litigation
outcome of the adversary proceeding was classified (1) as unsuccessful
for any predicted probability that was less than or equal to 0.5 and (2) as
successful for any predicted probability that was greater than 0.5. The
model correctly predicted litigation success in 68.9% of the
observations. 158
Of course, without referring to any of the independent variables in the
model, one could correctly classify the outcome in some of the
observations by assigning the most frequent category of outcome—that
is, the marginal distribution of the dependent variable—to all of the
observations. In this instance, one could correctly classify the outcome

158. The proportion of correct predictions is referred to as the count R2. J. SCOTT LONG,
REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 107 (1997).
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in approximately 61.1% of the observations by guessing that the debtor
did not experience litigation success in the adversary proceeding. 159
Thus, when predicting with the model that includes the independent
variables, the error rate drops by approximately 20.1% compared to a
prediction based solely on the marginal distribution of the dependent
variable. 160
The model results support the hypothesis that self-represented debtors
will experience less litigation success than represented debtors. 161 The
represented status of the debtor is a statistically significant predictor of
litigation success in the adversary proceeding. The model indicates that,
holding all other variables constant, the odds of litigation success
decrease by 68.9% [45.5, 82.3] if the debtor is self-represented. 162 To
illustrate the relationship between the debtor’s represented status and
litigation success, Figure 1 plots two kernel densities of the predicted
probability of litigation success—one for adversary proceedings
involving represented debtors and the other for adversary proceedings
involving self-represented debtors. The predicted probabilities are those
that have been calculated for each observation in the model given the
actual values of the independent variables for that observation.
Examination of the overlaying density curves in Figure 1 reveals that
the curve for self-represented debtors has a higher peak than the one for
represented debtors. Moreover, the former peak appears at the lower end
of the probability scale (i.e., where the predicted probability of litigation
success is less than 0.5), thus indicating the greater tendency for
litigation failure by self-represented debtors. On the other hand, the
highest peak of the curve for represented debtors appears at the upper
end of the probability scale (i.e., where the predicted probability of
litigation success is greater than 0.5), thus indicating the greater
tendency for litigation success by represented debtors.

159. For the 374 observations included in the model, 229 observations involved a debtor who did
not experience litigation success.
160. The proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly predicted
with the marginal distribution of the dependent variable is referred to as the adjusted count R2.
LONG, supra note 158, at 108.
161. See infra Appendix Table A8.
162. The findings reported in this Section remain qualitatively unchanged with alternative
specifications of the logistic regression model. These specifications include additional independent
variables, such as the monthly income, monthly expenses, and educational debt of the debtor as of
the commencement of the case. For each of the specifications, the model coefficients remain
correlated in the same direction as those reported here. Likewise, the statistically significant
coefficients from the alternative specifications are the same as the statistically significant
coefficients for the logistic regression model reported here.
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Figure 1
Kernel Density Plot of Debtor Litigation Success by Represented Status

Interpreting the magnitude of the effect of the represented status of
the debtor on litigation success presents some difficulty given the
nonlinear nature of the logistic regression model. Because of the
nonlinearity, the effect of a change in one independent variable depends
on the values of all other variables in the model. Accordingly, to
facilitate interpretation of the effect of represented status on litigation
success, the Article focuses on the example of the “typical” debtor that
appeared in the 357 observations from the Representative Sample that
were included in the model. The “typical” debtor is one who exhibited
(1) the modal values for categorical data characteristics (e.g., represented
status, Brunner jurisdiction) and (2) the median value for interval data
characteristics (e.g., the ratio of educational debt to annual household
income, duration of the adversary proceeding). 163 The values for the
typical debtor are set forth below in Table 1. Because the typical debtor
was represented, the remainder of this Article will refer to such a debtor
as the “typical represented debtor.”

163. For a discussion of the two alternative tests applied by courts to evaluate a debtor’s undue
hardship claim (i.e., the Brunner test and the totality test), see supra Part II.C.3.
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Table 1
The “Typical” Debtor
Categorical Data Characteristic

Mode

Represented Status

Represented
(71.2%)

Brunner Jurisdiction

Yes
(88.2%)

ECMC Appearance

No
(57.7%)

USDOE Appearance

No
(61.9%)

2012 Adversary Proceeding

Yes
(52.4%)

Trial Held

No
(92.4%)

Interval Data Characteristic

Median

Duration of Adversary Proceeding
(Days)

245

Number of Filed Documents

23

Time to Filing Adversary
Proceeding (Days)

92

Ratio of Educational Debt to
Annual Household Income

2.35

According to the model, the predicted probability of litigation success
for the typical represented debtor is 56.2% [44.6, 67.7]. On the other
hand, when changing the represented status of the typical debtor from
represented to self-represented (the “typical self-represented debtor”),
the predicted probability of litigation success dramatically drops to
28.5% [15.9, 41.1]. Along similar lines, when estimating the discrete
change in the predicted probability of litigation success for a change in
the represented status of the debtor, the predicted probability of litigation
success for the typical self-represented debtor is 27.7 [15.5, 39.9]
percentage points lower than the typical represented debtor.
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The model further reveals that the number of filed documents and the
appearance of ECMC are statistically significant predictors of litigation
success in the adversary proceeding. The number of filed documents is
positively correlated with litigation success, while the appearance of
ECMC is negatively correlated with litigation. Each of these findings
will now be discussed in greater detail.
The model indicates that, holding all other variables constant, the
odds of litigation success increase by 2.9% [1.4, 4.3] for each additional
document filed in the adversary proceeding. To further interpret this
finding, consider the profile of (1) the typical represented debtor and
(2) the typical self-represented debtor.
As illustrated in Figure 2 below and as set forth in Table A9 of the
Appendix, the predicted probability of litigation success increases for the
typical represented debtor as the number of filed documents increase.
Likewise, the predicted probability of litigation success for the typical
self-represented debtor increases as the number of filed documents
increase. The size of the effect of increased filings, however, is not
substantial. For example, increasing the number of filed documents from
twenty to thirty for the typical represented debtor is estimated to increase
the predicted probability of litigation success by only 6.9 [3.5, 10.2]
percentage points. For the typical self-represented debtor, increasing the
number of filed documents from twenty to thirty has an effect of similar
magnitude—that is, increasing the predicted probability of litigation
success by only 5.9 [2.7, 9.1] percentage points. Nonetheless, the latter
debtor (i.e., the typical self-represented debtor whose adversary
proceeding has thirty filed documents) has a dramatically lower
predicted probability of litigation success, 32.7% [19.1, 46.3], than a
similarly situated represented debtor, whose predicted probability of
litigation success is 61.0% [49.3, 72.7]. This difference emphasizes the
substantial magnitude of the effect that a debtor’s represented status has
on litigation success.
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Predicted Probability of Debtor Litigation Success by
Number of Filed Documents and Represented Status
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The model further indicates that, holding all other variables constant,
the odds of litigation success decrease by 70.1% [50.0, 82.1] if ECMC
appears as a litigant in the adversary proceeding. To illustrate the
relationship between the appearance of ECMC in the adversary
proceeding and litigation success, Figure 3 plots two kernel densities of
the predicted probability of litigation success—one for adversary
proceedings in which ECMC appeared and the other for adversary
proceedings in which ECMC did not appear. Once again, the predicted
probabilities are those that have been calculated for each observation in
the model given the actual values of the independent variables for that
observation.
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Kernel Density Plot of Debtor Litigation Success
by ECMC Appearance
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Examination of the overlaying density curves reveals that the curve
for adversary proceedings that involved an appearance by ECMC has a
higher peak than the one for adversary proceedings in which ECMC did
not appear. Moreover, the highest peak of the former curve appears at
the lower end of the probability scale (i.e., where the predicted
probability of litigation success is less than 0.5), thus indicating the
greater tendency for litigation failure for debtors whose adversary
proceedings involve ECMC. On the other hand, the highest peak of the
curve for adversary proceedings not involving ECMC appears at the
upper end of the probability scale (i.e., where the predicted probability
of litigation success is greater than 0.5), thus indicating the greater
tendency for litigation success by debtors whose adversary proceedings
do not involve ECMC.
To further interpret this finding, consider the following predicted
probabilities set forth below in Table 2. First, recall that the predicted
probability of litigation success for the typical represented debtor (whose
adversary proceeding does not involve an appearance by ECMC) is
56.2% [44.6, 67.7] and that the predicted probability of litigation success
for the typical self-represented debtor dramatically drops to 28.5% [15.9,
41.1]. Second, consider the manner in which the predicted probabilities
are further reduced when the adversary proceedings for both of these
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debtors involve an appearance by ECMC. For the typical represented
debtor, the predicted probability of litigation success plummets to 27.7%
[17.5, 37.9]. For the typical self-represented debtor, the predicted
probability of litigation success drops to 10.7% [3.9, 17.4].
Table 2
Predicted Probability of Debtor Litigation Success by
ECMC Appearance and Represented Status
Represented Status
ECMC Appearance

Represented Debtor

Self-Represented Debtor

No

56.2%
[44.6, 67.7]

28.5%
[15.9, 41.1]

Yes

27.7%
[17.5, 37.9]

10.7%
[3.9, 17.4]

The appearance of ECMC in the adversary proceeding has an effect of
far greater magnitude on the litigation outcome for the typical
represented debtor—that is, altering the predicted outcome from
litigation success to litigation failure—than on the litigation outcome for
the typical self-represented debtor—that is, further increasing the
likelihood of what was already predicted to be litigation failure. Put
another way, the discrete change in the predicted probability of litigation
success for the typical represented debtor is estimated to drop by 28.5
[17.0, 40.0] percentage points when ECMC makes an appearance; on the
other hand, the discrete change in the predicted probability of litigation
success for the typical self-represented debtor is estimated to drop by
only 17.9 [8.7, 27.0] percentage points when ECMC makes an
appearance.
E.

Interpretation and Implications of Results

This section evaluates the findings and nonfindings from this study.
Analyses of the data revealed three determinants of litigation success in
educational-debt dischargeability determinations: (1) the represented
status of the debtor; (2) the appearance of ECMC in the proceeding; and
(3) the number of documents filed in the proceeding. The first two
determinants were associated with a statistically significant decrease in
the likelihood of litigation success, whereas the third determinant was
associated with a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of
litigation success. Additionally, the study did not find any statistically
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significant relationship between the debtor’s financial circumstances and
litigation outcome. The discussion that follows presents an account of
how these findings buttress the claim that procedural complexity
presents a significant access-to-justice barrier that interferes with the
ability of self-represented debtors to vindicate their discharge right.
1.

The Represented Status of the Debtor

To begin, consider the study’s principal finding that self-represented
debtors have a statistically significantly lower likelihood of experiencing
litigation success than represented debtors. Given all of the other control
variables in the study, the fact that self-represented debtors fared worse
than their represented counterparts suggests that procedural complexity
has adversely affected the ability of self-represented debtors to present
the substance of their claims regarding the scope of discharge.164
Moreover, a comparison to the experience of the ability of debtors to
obtain a discharge further illustrates how increased procedural
complexity further exacerbates the barriers confronted by debtors in
vindicating their discharge right.
As discussed above, procedural complexity significantly increases
with the shift from filing for bankruptcy relief to litigating over the
scope of discharge. 165 Recall that, in the Study Population, the rate of
litigation success for self-represented debtors was observed to be 18.0
percentage points lower than that of represented debtors.166 In contrast,
for Chapter 7 consumer cases filed nationwide during roughly the threeyear period following the effective date of the 2005 amendments to the

164. One might ask whether the statistically significant difference in the success rates of
represented and self-represented debtors can be attributed to a potential selection effect—
specifically, that attorneys might be discouraged from representing debtors who have weaker claims
of undue hardship. If the weaker claims are less likely to result in litigation success, then the lower
success rates for self-represented debtors might not be attributable to lack of representation, but
rather to the merits of the debtor’s undue hardship claim. Such a concern is partly tempered by the
nature of the undue hardship inquiry, which largely focuses on the debtor’s current and future
ability to repay his educational debt. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26. Thus, one might
expect debtors who can afford representation to have undue hardship claims that are weaker than
those of debtors who cannot afford representation. See Pardo & Lacey, Discharge Litigation, supra
note 102, at 191–92 (“For those debtors who have the resources required to litigate a claim of undue
hardship, their claim ironically becomes less sympathetic insofar as the creditor may be able to
point to such resources as a potential source of repayment.”). It should further be noted that, in the
Representative Sample, self-represented debtors had statistically significantly lower amounts of
monthly income and monthly disposable income than represented debtors. See infra Appendix
Table A10.
165. See supra Part I.
166. See supra Part II.B.
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Bankruptcy Code, 167 which increased the procedural complexity of filing
for bankruptcy relief, 168 the discharge rate for self-represented debtors
was observed to be 10.2 percentage points lower than that of represented
debtors. 169 That the success-rate gap between represented and selfrepresented debtors is larger in the setting of educational-debt
dischargeability determinations further highlights the burdens that have
been imposed on debtors as a result of a legal framework that establishes
full-blown adversary procedure as the means to relief.
Although this study did not have any formal hypotheses regarding the
two other determinants of litigation success, they are discussed here as a
vehicle for informing future studies of bankruptcy litigation. The goal is
to hypothesize why such statistically significant relationships were
observed and whether they have substantive significance, with the hope
that these hypotheses will serve as a basis for new lines of inquiry that
confirm or reject the observed patterns.
2.

The Appearance of ECMC

The finding that the appearance by ECMC is statistically significantly
associated with a decreased likelihood of litigation success for debtors
raises interesting questions about the role of repeat players within the
bankruptcy system. Prior research has theorized that access-to-justice
barriers inherent in educational-debt dischargeability determinations
create opportunities for creditors to overreach by ignoring procedural
requirements and by espousing frivolous legal arguments. 170
Furthermore, that research documented how procedural noncompliance
and pollutive litigation by ECMC had prejudicially distorted the form in
which courts have considered debtors’ claims for relief. 171 A possible
implication of that evidence was that “ECMC’s procedural
noncompliance and pollutive litigation decrease a debtor’s odds of
prevailing in those proceedings where such litigation conduct occurs.” 172
Recall that, in this study, the statistically significant negative correlation
between ECMC’s appearance and litigation success for the debtor
167. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). The effective date of the 2005
amendments was October 17, 2005. See id. § 1501(a), 119 Stat. at 216.
168. See Pardo, Access, supra note 112, at 15–18.
169. Pardo, Self-Representation, supra note 4, at 94–95 (discussing discharge rates from Lupica,
supra note 34).
170. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2106–21.
171. See id. at 2142–73.
172. Id. at 2173.
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persisted when controlling for other factors, including the represented
status of the debtor. 173 This finding invites further empirical examination
into what accounts for the litigation success of certain repeat players—
that is, whether such success can be attributed to resource and
informational asymmetries, reputational effects, litigation misbehavior,
or some combination thereof. 174
3.

The Number of Filed Documents

The finding that the number of filed documents is statistically
significantly associated with an increased likelihood of litigation success
for debtors, regardless of their represented status, suggests that
vigorously contesting the creditor works to the advantage of debtors—
that is, the idea of living to fight another day. 175 Unfortunately, there are
serious obstacles for both self-represented and represented debtors that
will hinder them from robustly challenging creditors.
As previously mentioned, faced with the daunting task of navigating a
highly technical and complex legal process, some self-represented
debtors give up in despair, failing to live to fight another day. 176 For
those self-represented debtors who do not initially give up, vigorously
litigating over their discharge right will take time, an investment that can

173. See supra Part II.D. For an example of how procedural noncompliance has at times
contributed to ECMC’s litigation success, see Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2160–63 (describing
improper discovery practice by ECMC in a particular educational-debt dischargeability
determination).
174. See Nash & Pardo, Ideology, supra note 76, at 942–44 (discussing the dynamic of resource
and informational asymmetries in debt-dischargeability determinations); Neustadter, supra note 60,
at 367–411 (documenting procedural noncompliance and pollutive litigation by Heritage Pacific
Financial, L.L.C. in 218 debt-dischargeability determinations regarding debts alleged to have been
fraudulently incurred and discussing resource and informational asymmetries favoring Heritage);
Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2145–46 (discussing how resource asymmetries have favored
ECMC in educational-debt dischargeability determinations); Pardo & Lacey, Discharge Litigation,
supra note 102, at 219 n.151 (discussing informational, resource, and reputational advantages that
favor the DOE in educational-debt dischargeability determinations).
175. Janger, supra note 80, at 606 (“Increased expenditure by litigating parties will increase the
likelihood of success in bankruptcy court.”).
176. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; cf. Mann & Porter, supra note 41, at 316
(“[D]ebtors must ‘save up’ certain emotional resources, such as humility, before they will consider
bankruptcy.”); D. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 9), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2633032 [https://perma.cc/NVW3-JU2S] (“Solving
justiciable problems typically requires action . . . .We hypothesize that failures to take action are in
part a function of the psychological and mental state a lay individual finds herself in when faced
with a justiciable problem: overtaxed, anxious, unfamiliar with legal mundanity.”).
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severely disrupt everyday life, 177 and that ultimately may prove to be
prohibitive for some debtors. 178
For represented debtors, a highly contested proceeding will also
require time, but it will be the debtor’s attorney’s time that is implicated.
We might expect that vigorous contestation will drag out a
proceeding, 179 which inevitably would have a bearing on the costs of
litigation. It has been empirically documented that, even when
controlling for other factors, an increase in case duration is associated
with a statistically significant increase in the litigation costs for both
plaintiffs and defendants in federal civil cases. 180 But, as previously
discussed, debtors are not likely to be able to fund protracted
litigation. 181 If represented debtors can only afford to pay a limited lump
sum for representation throughout the proceeding, debtor attorneys will
have little economic incentive to engage in vigorous contestation, thus
potentially undermining the ability of their clients to vindicate their
discharge right. 182 Further empirical inquiry is warranted to explore
whether the filing activity in bankruptcy litigation is a telltale sign of a
177. See, e.g., Sperazza v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sperazza), 366 B.R. 397, 405 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[B]ecause of the fact that I had no choice but to prepare and litigate my own
adversary proceeding, . . . I also had no choice but to temporarily suspend my job seeking
activities—mainly the applying for specific jobs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. Cf. Greiner et al., supra note 176 (manuscript at 10) (discussing how self-represented, lowto-moderate-income individuals must contend with the challenges of “overtaxed bandwidth and
little excess prospective memory”).
179. For the debtors in the Study Population, the number of filed documents was associated with
a statistically significant increase in the duration of the proceeding according to a nonparametric
Spearman rank correlation (n = 1,415; 𝜌𝜌 = 0.6616; p < 0.0001).
180. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 5, 7 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNT6-BQKR].
181. See supra text accompanying note 62; see also, e.g., Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel at 2,
Hester v. White (In re White), Ch. 7 Case No. 14-25727, Adv. No. 14-02263 (Bankr. D. Utah Oct.
1, 2015), ECF No. 16 (“The reason for withdrawal is that Client has incurred legal fees in a sum
exceeding $30,000.00 in connection with the main case and two (2) pending adversary proceedings.
Furthermore, Drake has joined the firm of Miller Toone, P.C., and Client is unable to pay the
requested retainer for continued representation by that firm.”); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (“[T]he poorer party might be forced to settle because
he does not have the resources to finance the litigation, to cover either his own projected expenses,
such as his lawyer’s time, or the expenses his opponent can impose through the manipulation of
procedural mechanisms such as discovery.”).
182. Cf. Fiss, supra note 181, at 1078 (“In many situations, however, individuals are ensnared in
contractual relationships that impair their autonomy: Lawyers . . . might, for example, agree to
settlements that are in their interests but are not in the best interests of their clients . . . .”); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 172 (1996)
(“The attorney can control the client’s frame, thereby influencing settlement decisions in either
direction. The attorney may or may not use this ability to serve his clients’ best interests.”).
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principal-agent problem—specifically, attorneys for debtors failing to
act in their clients’ best interests.183
Finally, consider that no statistically significant relationship was
found between the debtor’s financial circumstances and the likelihood of
litigation success. Undeniably, the debtor’s financial circumstances
should give content to the law and thus be predictive of outcome. 184 But
here they were not, 185 a finding that is consistent with prior empirical
studies of educational-debt dischargeability determinations that have
failed to unearth such a statistically significant association. 186
The disparate litigation outcomes experienced by debtors with
similarly dire financial circumstances points to the pernicious effects of
requiring debtors to prove their eligibility for relief pursuant to vague
and indeterminate standards (in this case, undue hardship):
If one conceives of bankruptcy court doctrine as serving a
signaling function to litigants regarding the likelihood of relief
for the debtor, and if that doctrine is generally unclear, it seems
more likely that litigants will not have overlapping expectations
regarding the outcome of undue hardship discharge proceedings.
This state of affairs will discourage settlement, requiring
litigants to incur more litigation costs. On balance, such costs
will have a disproportionate impact on debtors who file for
bankruptcy as a result of financial distress and a lack of
monetary resources. When coupled with the complex and
protracted procedure of an adversary proceeding, the
indeterminacy of the undue hardship standard creates an
environment hospitable to attrition litigation by creditors.187
At the end of the day, if litigation is deemed to be a desirable channel
for vindicating the discharge right, then serious consideration must be
given to amending the substantive law for relief so that it is more
183. See, e.g., In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404, 408 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (“Vulnerable would-be
debtors, who are often in desperate straits, may need protection against their attorneys, who
themselves may be tempted to put their own financial interests ahead of those of the debtors.”);
Whitford, supra note 44, at 406 (“Rather than making informed decisions reflecting their particular
circumstances and personal goals, debtors are steered to particular choices by their attorneys. Too
often, I believe, those choices reflect the best interests of the attorneys rather than the interests of
debtors themselves.”).
184. See Rafael I. Pardo, Illness and Inability to Repay: The Role of Debtor Health in the
Discharge of Educational Debt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2008) [hereinafter Pardo, Debtor
Health].
185. See infra Appendix Table A5.
186. See Pardo, Debtor Health, supra note 184, at 510–11; Pardo & Lacey, Discharge Litigation,
supra note 102, at 215, 216 tbl.3.
187. Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2109–10 (footnotes omitted).
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crystalline, 188 “[i]n the hopes of ensuring fair debtor treatment,
promoting certainty, and reducing costs.” 189
III. REFORMING DISCHARGE LITIGATION
The discussion regarding the implications of this empirical study
suggests that there are various reforms that could improve the plight of
debtors who seek to vindicate their discharge right: (1) simplifying the
substance of the law; (2) increasing the assistance available to debtors;
and (3) reducing the procedural complexity of discharge litigation. As
has been discussed elsewhere, Congress and the Supreme Court are the
two primary actors who could simplify the substance of the law, 190 but
neither has shown an inclination to do so. 191 Accordingly, that leaves the
latter two options as the more likely avenues for reform.
This Part will first discuss how one possibility for increasing the
assistance available to debtors—fee-shifting legislation—has proved to
be largely ineffective at doing so. 192 The discussion will then shift to
how procedural complexity can be reduced, first cautioning against ad
hoc judicial reform efforts and then arguing for procedural reform
through the rulemaking process.
A.

Fee-Shifting Legislation

If representation improves the likelihood of a debtor’s ability to
vindicate his discharge right, one avenue of reform would be to find the
means to increase the availability of representation for debtors. The
problem, as discussed above, 193 is that many debtors are likely to be
priced out of the market for legal services relating to discharge litigation,
as suggested by various statistics from this study. First, recall the 32.5%
188. See Janger, supra note 80, at 619–20.
189. Pardo & Lacey, Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 3, at 521.
190. See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 391, 401–02, 438–39 (2012).
191. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of
Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 221–30 (2004) (discussing Congress’s inability to engage in
effective reform efforts to improve deficiencies in the bankruptcy system); Pardo & Watts, supra
note 190, at 438 (discussing the dearth of bankruptcy decisions by the Supreme Court).
192. Another possibility for increasing the assistance available to debtors would be the creation of
effective self-help materials. See Greiner et al., supra note 176 (manuscript at 51) (“[T]he volume of
litigants who interact with the formal legal system without any form of professional assistance
means that effective self-help materials must be part of any reasonable access to justice strategy.”).
For a comprehensive discussion on reconceptualizing self-help materials, see id. at 17–44.
193. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
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self-representation rate for debtors in the Study Population, 194 which far
exceeds the self-representation rate for debtors in Chapter 7 consumer
cases (i.e., less than 8%), 195 as well as the self-representation rate for
litigants in federal civil cases (i.e., approximately 10%). 196 It has been
observed that “statistics on self-representation . . . make a compelling
case for overpricing,” 197 and the high self-representation rate for debtors
in this study certainly points to a serious accessibility problem in the
context of discharge litigation.
Lending further support to the “priced-out” theory, self-represented
debtors in the Representative Sample had statistically significantly lower
amounts of monthly income and monthly disposable income than
represented debtors, 198 and an estimated 18.7% [12.7, 26.6] of selfrepresented debtors in the Study Population had been represented by
counsel when they initially filed for bankruptcy relief. 199 The inability of
debtors to pay for representation presents one of the serious challenges
to reform in this area. 200 Compounding the affordability paradox, 201
debtors generally cannot enlist the aid of counsel through a contingentfee arrangement because the discharge of debt does not generate a
monetary award. 202
There is, however, one type of discharge litigation for which an
attorney could theoretically represent a debtor on a contingency basis:
adversary proceedings to determine whether a debt should be deemed
nondischargeable as a result of the debtor’s fraud in incurring the debt

194. See supra Part II.C.2.
195. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
196. See Lee, supra note 65, at 506.
197. Richard Zorza, Some First Thoughts on Court Simplification: The Key to Civil Access and
Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 845, 848 (2013).
198. See infra Appendix Table A10. Self-represented debtors in Chapter 7 consumer cases have
likewise been found to have statistically significantly lower amounts of monthly income and
monthly disposable income than represented debtors. See, e.g., Pardo, Self-Representation, supra
note 4, at 102 tbl.5.2.
199. This estimate is based on the Representative Sample. Of the 123 self-represented debtors in
the sample, twenty-three had been represented by counsel when they initially filed for bankruptcy
relief.
200. Cf. Lee, supra note 65, at 500 (describing “access to justice as a function of the cost of civil
litigation”).
201. Cf. Pardo, Debtor Health, supra note 184, at 517 n.52 (“Given that debtors who seek an
undue hardship discharge are likely to lack the resources necessary to litigate the matter generally,
courts have recognized the paradox that arises from a rule requiring debtors to present expert
testimony, which entails more financial resources, to support an undue hardship claim based on a
medical condition.” (citations omitted)).
202. See supra Part I.A.
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(“fraudulent-debt dischargeability determinations”). 203 For such
proceedings, if the debtor prevails and the debt is deemed dischargeable,
the Bankruptcy Code provides that “the court shall grant judgment in
favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney’s fee for,
the proceeding if the court finds that the position of the creditor was not
substantially justified.” 204 The Code further provides, however, “that the
court shall not award such costs and fees if special circumstances would
make the award unjust.” 205
Given the possibility of a debtor being awarded fees and costs in such
litigation, an attorney might be incentivized to take on such
representation, for the right client, entirely on the contingency of
procuring such an award. If sufficiently robust, such a fee-shifting
provision could create a larger market for legal services that would
increase the accessibility of representation for some debtors in discharge
litigation. 206 Furthermore, the provision’s applicability could be
extended. For example, one congressional bill has proposed that the
Code be amended to expand the reach of this fee-shifting provision so
that it also applies to educational-debt dischargeability determinations. 207
To assess whether the Code’s current fee-shifting provision might be
a model for viable reform, this Article once again relies on empirical
data, this time looking at the experience of debtors in fraudulent-debt
dischargeability determinations. A search query was formulated in
Bloomberg Law’s “Dockets” database, 208 with the query retrieval based
on the following parameters: (1) limiting the search to all U.S.
203. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2012).
204. Id. § 523(d).
205. Id.
206. Cf. 2 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 18, app. G-1.c at 27 (1997) (“To
encourage adequate representation of consumer debtors, we strongly recommend that, as to debtors
with primarily consumer debts, the award of costs and attorneys’ fees be mandatory.”); Lee, supra
note 65, at 503 (“A potential plaintiff with a large enough and strong enough claim may be able to
find an attorney to handle the case on a contingency fee.”).
207. Stopping Abusive Student Loan Collection Practices in Bankruptcy Act of 2015, H.R. 100,
114th Cong. § 2 (as referred to the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 6, 2015). Interestingly, the fact
that the Code’s fee-shifting provision does not currently and has never extended to educational-debt
dischargeability determinations has not stopped debtors from erroneously requesting that they be
awarded fees and costs under that provision. See, e.g., Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaim ¶ 47,
Cal. Coast Univ. v. Aleckna (In re Aleckna), Ch. 13 Case No. 12-03367, Adv. No. 12-00247
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sep. 7, 2012), ECF No. 3 (“Defendant is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).”); Motion by Debtor John Carl DelBonis for Assessment of Fees and
Costs Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(d), TI Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis (In re DelBonis), Ch. 7
Case No. 93-18441, Adv. No. 93-02003 (Bankr. D. Mass. June 3, 1994), ECF No. 13.
208. BLOOMBERG LAW, http://www.bloomberglaw.com/dockets (last visited Feb. 20, 2016)
(subscription required).

08 - Pardo.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

TAKING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

10/17/2016 8:22 AM

1163

bankruptcy court dockets; (2) limiting query retrieval to dockets that
were opened in 2014; and (3) searching by the nature-of-suit code
assigned to fraudulent-debt dischargeability determinations. 209 The
search query yielded 4,362 results, and a random sample of 527
proceedings was drawn. This random sample is used to provide a
preliminary account for testing and reconsidering assumptions that have
been made regarding the efficacy of the Code’s fee-shifting provision.
The data suggest that the Code’s fee-shifting provision may not be a
promising avenue for increasing debtor representation in discharge
litigation. It is estimated that, of the fraudulent-debt dischargeability
determinations that were commenced in U.S. bankruptcy courts during
2014, 210 approximately 37.4% [33.4, 41.6] involved fully selfrepresented debtors. Given that this self-representation rate exceeds the
self-representation rate of debtors in educational-debt dischargeability
determinations, 211 it casts doubt on whether the fee-shifting provision
has facilitated the creation of a more accessible market for representation
in discharge litigation.
Relatedly, the data reveal that debtors rarely seek to avail themselves
of the fee-shifting provision. In the above-referenced determinations, it
is estimated that only 19.7% [16.1, 23.8] of the debtors prevailed, 212
with represented debtors prevailing at a statistically significant greater
rate. 213 It is further estimated that merely 3.7% [0.8, 10.6] of the
prevailing debtors sought to recover fees and costs pursuant to the

209. The nature-of-suit (NOS) code for such determinations is “62-Dischargeability - § 523(a)(2),
false pretenses, false representation, actual fraud.” Official Form B1040 (“Adversary Proceeding
Cover Sheet”), http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/adversary-proceeding-coversheet-0 [https://perma.cc/7ACM-8KDY]. For a discussion on the limitations of using an NOS code
to construct a sample, see Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2130 n.184.
210. Because federal jurisdiction over debt-dischargeability determinations is original, but not
exclusive, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012), such determinations can be made by the appropriate state
court, see, e.g., In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 866, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
211. See supra Part II.C.2.
212. As of this writing, a disposition had been made in approximately 90.7% (i.e., 478 of 527) of
the fraudulent-debt dischargeability determinations in the random sample—that is, the court had
entered an order disposing of the claim that the debtor had fraudulently incurred the debt at issue.
Of those dispositions, approximately 87.2% (i.e., 417 of 478) constituted a merits-based disposition.
The debtor prevailed in approximately 19.7% (i.e., 82 of the 417) of the merits-based dispositions.
213. In the absence of a relationship between the represented status of the debtor and the outcome
of the fraudulent-debt dischargeability determination, one would expect to see debtors from the
random sample prevail 19.7% of the time. See supra note 212. The data reveal, however, that
represented debtors prevailed 24.4% of the time, whereas self-represented debtors prevailed only
12.3% of the time. A chi-square test with one degree of freedom indicates that the difference
between the observed and expected values is statistically significant (p = 0.002). These calculations
are based on the 417 merits-based dispositions in the random sample. See id.
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Code’s fee-shifting provision. 214 Finally, of the three debtors in the
random sample who sought a fee award, only one succeeded. 215
What might account for the fee-shifting provision’s failure to live up
to its promise, as envisioned by Congress, 216 to level the playing field
between creditors and debtors in fraudulent-debt dischargeability
determinations? The answer simply may be that the current version of
the provision has been suboptimally designed and thus destined to fail.
Recall that the prevailing debtor may recover fees and costs only “if the
court finds that the position of the creditor was not substantially
justified.” 217 As Professor Jonathan Nash and I have observed elsewhere:
[I]t seems reasonable to conclude that debtors may not seek to
vindicate their entitlement to such fees. It would be quite
daunting and risky to engage in a second round of litigation with
the creditor, only to fail to establish that “the position of the
creditor was not substantially justified.” And, even if the debtor
made such a showing, the creditor could still avoid liability “if
special circumstances would make the award unjust.” 218
Put another way, as currently drafted, the fee-shifting provision poses
too much risk and uncertainty to make the game worth the candle. 219
If fee-shifting provisions are to play a productive role in helping
debtors vindicate their discharge right, such provisions will have to be
214. This estimate is based on the dispositions in the random sample in which the debtor
prevailed, of which there were eighty-two. See id. All of the debtors who sought to recover fees and
costs were represented debtors. It should be noted that self-represented debtors are not precluded
from recovering fees and costs under the Code’s fee-shifting provision. See Trs. of the Will Cty.
Carpenters, Local 174, Health & Welfare Fund v. Cooney, 532 B.R. 296, 299 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
215. These findings comport with the findings of a case study analyzing 218 fraudulent-debt
dischargeability determinations involving the same plaintiff-creditor. See Neustadter, supra note 60,
at 415–18.
216. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 80 (1978) (“The purpose of the provision is to discourage
creditors from initiating proceedings . . . in the hope of obtaining a settlement from an honest debtor
anxious to save attorney’s fees. Such practices impair the debtor’s fresh start and are contrary to the
spirit of the bankruptcy laws.”), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5866; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 131 (1977) (“The threat of litigation over this exception to discharge and its attendant costs are
often enough to induce the debtor to settle for a reduced sum, in order to avoid the costs of
litigation. Thus, creditors with marginal cases are usually able to have at least part of their claim
excepted from discharge . . . , even though the merits of the case are weak.”), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6092.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).
218. Nash & Pardo, Ideology, supra note 76, at 980–81 (footnote omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(d)).
219. See 2 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 18, app. G-1.c at 27 (“These conditions
[i.e., ‘substantially justified’ and ‘special circumstances’] have resulted in a reluctance by many
courts to award fees and costs to prevailing debtors, with the result that debtors cannot be assured of
recovering their costs of litigation when they prevail.”).
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optimally drafted. 220 It should further be kept in mind that even a robust
fee-shifting provision will not be a cure-all. Having access to
representation does not necessarily mean that a debtor will be able to
enlist the assistance of a high-quality attorney who obtains successful
outcomes for his clients. 221 Accordingly, it becomes imperative to
consider in tandem other means for reforming discharge litigation—
specifically, means by which its complexity might be reduced.
B.

Ad Hoc Judicial Reform Efforts

Given the tendency of bankruptcy judges to be actively involved in
case management, both with respect to a debtor’s underlying bankruptcy
case as well as adversary proceedings within the case, 222 another
opportunity for reform potentially lies in the ability of bankruptcy judges
to achieve just results 223 through managerial judging. 224 As described by
Professor E. Donald Elliott, “[m]anagerial judges believe that the system
does not work; that something must be done to make it work; and that
the only plausible solution to the problem is ad hoc procedural activism
by judges.” 225 In support of managerial judging, he has argued that it
“can be justified not only in terms of reducing the procedural costs of
220. As originally drafted, the Code’s fee-shifting provision mandated that the court award a
prevailing debtor in a fraudulent-debt dischargeability determination fees and costs “unless such
granting of judgment would be clearly inequitable.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (Supp. III 1979) (amended
1984). For the argument that the current provision should be restored to its former version, see
Neustadter, supra note 60, at 430.
221. Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2139–40 (providing examples of low-quality attorneys who
have represented debtors in educational-debt dischargeability determinations); Pardo & Lacey,
Discharge Litigation, supra note 102, at 220–21, 222 tbl.6 (finding that debtors represented by a
particular attorney had a statistically significantly lower percentage of educational debt discharged
than debtors who were not represented by that attorney); see also In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444, 450
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The most frustrating aspect of this judicial position is opening case files
on a daily basis and discovering clients who are not effectively represented by their lawyers.”).
222. See Stacy Kleiner Humphries & Robert L. R. Munden, Painting a Self-Portrait: A Look at
the Composition and Style of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 76, 82, 105 (1997);
Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 576; see also,
e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMP. L. REV.
875, 892 (2015) (noting how a bankruptcy judge in California “has developed his own set of rules
and requirements for Chapter 13 that expressly depart from, at the very least, the local rules of
procedure in the district”).
223. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (“These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.”).
224. For the argument that bankruptcy judges may not be inclined to engage in this type of
managerial judging, see Brooke D. Coleman, Easy Access to Loans, but What About Access to
Justice?, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. 56, 59–60 (2015).
225. E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
306, 309 (1986).
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civil litigation generally, but also by showing that managerial judging
improves the quality of substantive justice received by litigants in
particular cases.” 226 But he has also cautioned that managerial judging
has the potential to “reduce procedural fairness [because of] its ad hoc
character.” 227
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest specific management
procedures that could reduce the procedural complexity faced by debtors
when vindicating their discharge right. While recognizing that we can
“increase[] [the] quality of substantive justice . . . when managerial
judging techniques are applied appropriately,” 228 this Article seeks to
raise a cautionary flag that warns judges to think carefully about how
they deploy management procedures in their courtrooms. The decision
of the U.S Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (the Ninth
Circuit BAP) in Nichols v. Align Western States Learning Corp. (In re
Nichols) 229 demonstrates how “there may indeed be some costs
associated with managerial judging in terms of a loss of real or perceived
procedural fairness.” 230
At the trial level, Eric and Bonita Nichols commenced an adversary
proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona to
determine the dischargeability of the student loans that Mr. Nichols
owed to Align Western States Learning Corporation (“Align”). 231 Align
failed to timely answer the Nichols’ complaint, which prompted the
court clerk to enter a default against Align. 232 Align sought to set aside
the default, but rather than rule on the motion, the bankruptcy court
“decid[ed] instead to conduct a prove-up hearing to determine if [the]
debtors could establish a prima facie case for undue hardship.” 233
226. Id. at 326.
227. Id. at 328.
228. Id. at 327; see also Zorza, supra note 197, at 854–55 (“At its best, caseflow management can
be used to identify roadblocks and as an opportunity to provide services or to change procedures to
help remove those roadblocks.”).
229. No. AZ-12-1305-JuTaAh, 2013 WL 3497666 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 9, 2013), aff’d, 605 F.
App’x 660 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
230. Elliot, supra note 225, at 327.
231. In re Nichols, 2013 WL 3497666, at *1.
232. Id. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that, “[i]f a complaint is duly served, the defendant shall
serve an answer within 30 days after the issuance of the summons.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a).
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules—which applies in adversary proceedings by virtue of Bankruptcy
Rule 7055, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 7055—provides that, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (emphasis
added).
233. In re Nichols, 2013 WL 3497666, at *1.
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Pursuant to this procedure, the court would permit the Nichols to testify
and to present evidence in support of their undue hardship claim. 234
Align agreed only to cross-examine the debtors at the hearing without
further defending against their claim. 235 Thus, if the Nichols established
a prima facie case for undue hardship, the court would discharge their
debt. 236
After the prove-up hearing, the bankruptcy court determined that the
Nichols had failed to establish a prima facie case for undue hardship and
entered an order determining the debt to be nondischargeable and
dismissing the adversary proceeding. 237 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
BAP rejected the Nichols’ argument that the prove-up procedure had
denied them due process of law, noting that “[a]lthough not labeled as a
‘trial,’ [the prove-up] procedure accorded the Nichols full opportunity to
present an evidentiary showing to prove their claims and was more
favorable to them than a full trial because Align was not allowed to
present a defense, such as testimony from expert witnesses.” 238 In light
of this, the Ninth Circuit BAP opined that “[t]he Nichols’ complaint of
not having a trial rings hollow.” 239 A closer look at the relevant
procedure in the Nichols case, however, reveals that the bankruptcy
court improperly absolved Align from multiple evidentiary burdens,
thereby calling into question the quality of justice that the Nichols
received.
In fairness, it should be noted that the prove-up procedure
implemented by the bankruptcy court in Nichols was, in fact, a wellintentioned shortcut. The animating concern for the court appears to
have been to spare the Nichols, who were self-represented, 240 the time,
difficulty, and expense of litigating their adversary proceeding through a
traditional trial process involving discovery and the like.241

234. See id. at *1, *3.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at *2.
238. Id. at *3.
239. Id.
240. See Docket, Nichols v. Align W. States Learning Corp. (In re Nichols), Ch. 7 Case No. 1112027, Adv. No. 11-00784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. dismissed Apr. 19, 2012).
241. See Hearing Transcript at 13, Nichols v. Align W. States Learning Corp. (In re Nichols), Ch.
7 Case No. 11-12027, Adv. No. 11-00784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2011), ECF No. 22 [hereinafter
Nichols Hearing Transcript I] (“I don’t want to go down the road where we have a full-blown trial
on the matter, where you need to bring in your doctors and they need to testify, and Mr. Cox will
have his doctors come in and testify. I’m trying to avoid that.”); id. at 15 (“Again, I was trying to
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Notwithstanding these best intentions, the court’s procedure placed the
proverbial cart before the horse, essentially giving Align a free pass
through not one, but two evidentiary hurdles that would have doomed
the case for Align had it failed to carry either burden. 242
First and foremost, in the Ninth Circuit, relief from entry of default is
governed by a three-factor test pursuant to which a court must determine
(1) whether the defendant’s culpable conduct led to the default,
(2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) whether the
plaintiff will be prejudiced by such relief. 243 Importantly, the three-factor
test is “disjunctive, such that a finding that any one of these factors is
true is sufficient reason for the district court to refuse to set aside the
default.” 244 Thus, a court may refuse to set aside a default or default
judgment if it finds either culpability by the defaulting defendant, the
lack of a meritorious defense, or prejudice to the plaintiff. 245 Crucially,
as the moving party, the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish
that vacating a default is warranted. 246
By virtue of the bankruptcy court’s prove-up procedure, the creditor
in Nichols did not have to contend with its evidentiary burden for setting
aside the default that had been entered against it. This seems particularly
troublesome given that Align did not have a slam-dunk argument for
setting aside the default. Specifically, rather than filing an answer to the
Nichols’ complaint in their adversary proceeding, Align filed a proof of

short-circuit this. I was trying to get a prove-up hearing from the debtors. I was trying to get some
evidence from them in support of their position. I was trying to avoid a full-blown trial.”).
242. In its threadbare opinion affirming the Ninth Circuit BAP, it is readily apparent that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was oblivious to the evidentiary free pass that the bankruptcy
court gave to Align. See Nichols v. Align W. States Learning Corp. (In re Nichols), 605 F. App’x
660, 660–61 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“The bankruptcy court properly dismissed the Nichols’
adversary proceeding because they failed to make a prima facie showing that excepting the debt
from discharge would constitute an undue hardship.”).
243. See Brandt v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 653 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010);
TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001). The Federal Rules provide
that a “court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c); see also FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7055 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 55 in adversary proceedings).
244. Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091 (emphasis added).
245. Hammer v. Drago (In re Hammer), 940 F.2d 524, 525–26 (9th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Brandt,
653 F.3d at 1112; Emp. Painters’ Trust v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Because appellants were culpable with respect to the default and have no meritorious defense, the
district court acted well within its discretion when it refused to set aside the judgment.”); Direct
Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We
need not consider the first two factors because . . . the defendant’s culpable conduct was responsible
for the entry of the default judgment in this case.”).
246. TCI Grp., 244 F.3d at 696.
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claim 247 in the Nichols’ underlying bankruptcy case, 248 an action which
the bankruptcy court viewed unfavorably. 249 Although the court did not
articulate how this conduct would be analyzed under the legal standard
for setting aside a default, 250 Align’s decision to file only a proof of
claim relates to its culpability in failing to answer. Under Ninth Circuit
case law, “the defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual
or constructive notice of the filing of the action and intentionally failed
to answer.” 251 Furthermore, when the moving party is a “legally
sophisticated entity” that is represented by counsel, for purposes of
determining such party’s culpability in a default, “an understanding of
the consequences of its actions may be assumed, and with it,
intentionality.” 252
It is unclear how these issues would have been resolved if addressed
by the bankruptcy court in Nichols, 253 let alone how a finding of
culpability would have influenced the court to balance the three factors
considered in determining whether good cause exists to set aside a
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012) (providing that a creditor may file a proof of claim); FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3001 (detailing various aspects regarding a proof of claim).
248. See Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default ¶¶ 2–4, Nichols v. Align W. States Learning Corp.
(In re Nichols), Ch. 7 Case No. 11-12027, Adv. No. 11-00784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 26, 2011), ECF
No. 13.
249. See Hearing Transcript at 5, Nichols v. Align W. States Learning Corp. (In re Nichols), Ch.
7 Case No. 11-12027, Adv. No. 11-00784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 26, 2011), ECF No. 57 [hereinafter
Nichols Hearing Transcript II] (“Well, I don’t think filing a proof of claim, whether it’s in an
adversary or an administrative case helps you with an appropriate answer.”); id. at 6 (“But I think
the problem I’m having is the one that I’ve just stated on the record, and that is filing a proof of
claim in the administrative case, even if it’s filed in the adversary, doesn’t help the Defendant.
That’s my sticking point.”).
250. See id. at 6 (“But filing the proof of claim, I just don’t know what to do with that, Mr. Cox. I
think it’s just whether there’s the ability to set aside the default and whether your particular client
has the ability to proceed.”).
251. Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.
2010) (same); TCI Grp., 244 F.3d 691 at 697 (same); Hammer v. Drago (In re Hammer), 940 F.2d
524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
252. Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis added); cf. Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d
1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We agree that Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to remedy the effects of a
litigation decision that a party later comes to regret through subsequently-gained knowledge that
corrects the erroneous legal advice of counsel. For purposes of subsection (b)(1), parties should be
bound by and accountable for the deliberate actions of themselves and their chosen counsel.”).
253. For example, Align’s counsel at the initial hearing on the motion to vacate the default
represented to the court that he did not represent Align at the time that it filed the proof of claim.
See Nichols Hearing Transcript II, supra note 249, at 3. The record does not indicate whether Align
was represented by in-house counsel or other outside counsel when it made the decision to file the
proof of claim. This fact would be relevant to an analysis of whether Align’s default was
intentional. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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default. But that is the point. Align essentially received a free pass
without being put to its proof on its motion to vacate the default. The
consequences of this decision are quite significant. It might be that Align
would not have carried its burden. 254 If so, then the default would not
have been vacated. While true that the default by itself would not
necessarily require entry of a default judgment against Align, 255 a point
emphasized by the bankruptcy court to the Nichols, 256 the effect of the
unvacated default would have been to ease the Nichols’ evidentiary
burden at trial. 257 Or, in the alternative, if the bankruptcy court had
determined that Align met its burden in showing that good cause existed
to set aside the default, the opportunity would have existed for the
Nichols to argue on appeal that the court had abused its discretion in
doing so or that it had committed clear error in its fact finding. 258 Either
way, a set of litigation options that would otherwise have been available
to the Nichols evaporated once the bankruptcy court implemented the
prove-up procedure. 259

254. For an example of a student-loan creditor’s failure to carry its burden of proof on a motion to
set aside a default judgment under the “excusable neglect” standard of Federal Rule 60(b)(1), see
Gourlay v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Gourlay), 465 B.R. 124, 128–31 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2012).
255. This would be true whether entry of a default judgment was sought pursuant to Federal Rule
55(b)(1) or Federal Rule 55(b)(2). See, e.g., Fisher v. Taylor, 1 F.R.D. 448, 448 (E.D. Tenn. 1940)
(stating that “the court has power to enter an order of default and Rule 55 is not a limitation
thereof”); RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5.3, at 362 (3d ed. 2012) (“[T]he plaintiff has
no right to a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2), even though the defendant is clearly in
default. . . . [O]ur system of justice prefers to resolve disputes on the merits rather than on
technicalities. The matter is in the district judge’s discretion, and she may ask for evidence on any
relevant matter, including the strength of the plaintiff’s claim on the merits and the viability of any
defense the defendant might have.”).
256. The bankruptcy court in Nichols indicated as much to the Nichols. See Nichols Hearing
Transcript II, supra note 249, at 16 (“So even if Mr. Cox hadn’t filed anything, if it were simply a
situation that the default remained on the docket, I would still have you come in . . . because I don’t
have enough information to say that there’s a prima facie case [for undue hardship].”).
257. See, e.g., Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc. 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2009) (stating that “[a] ‘defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations
of fact’” (quoting Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975))); FREER, supra note 255, § 7.5.2, at 360 (stating that entry of default “cuts off the
defendant’s right to file a response to the complaint”).
258. See, e.g., Chavez v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., No. 94-16006, 1995 WL 242284, at *2
(9th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995).
259. The bankruptcy court in Nichols appears to have been aware, at least momentarily, that
fairness would dictate following proper procedure. See Nichols Hearing Transcript I, supra note
241, at 15 (“You started the process with your motion to set aside the default. I think you walked
through the issues and you indicated why it should be set aside. So if in fact you want to have a fullblown trial, in fairness to the debtors, I believe I have to go back and address again the motion to set
aside the default.”).
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To make matters worse, this procedure failed to take into account that
Align would have the initial burden at trial of establishing that the debt
owed by the Nichols qualified as the type of educational debt excepted
from discharge. 260 If Align had failed to make such a showing, that
failure would have constituted a basis for determining the debt to be
dischargeable, without the Nichols ever having to present any evidence
related to their claim of undue hardship. 261 The bankruptcy court appears
to have been blinded by slavish adherence to the principle that a debtor
bears the burden of proof to establish undue hardship. 262 As a result, it
failed to situate that burden properly within the Code’s bifurcated
burden-of-proof structure. 263
The blindness in this instance may have stemmed from the channeling
effect of the legal framework for vacating a default (the “vacatur
framework”), which does not fit neatly within the context of an
educational-debt dischargeability determination in bankruptcy. In a
garden-variety lawsuit, the plaintiff will sue a defendant for coercive
relief on account of the defendant’s harmful conduct (e.g., damages for
breach of contract). Within this context, the vacatur framework naturally
demands whether a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s claim exists:
“[i]t makes no sense to set aside a default, and thus to put the case back

260. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
261. See EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 272 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A court may
grant a Rule 52(c) motion made by either party or may grant judgment sua sponte at any time
during a bench trial, so long as the party against whom judgment is to be rendered has been ‘fully
heard’ with respect to an issue essential to that party’s case. As a result, the court need not wait until
that party rests its case-in-chief to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 52(c).”); cf. Sepulveda v. Pacific
Maritime Ass’n, 878 F.2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In a bench trial, the court may involuntarily
dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) when the court finds, after considering the evidence, that the
plaintiff has not established a prima facie case.”). Federal Rule 52(c) provides that, “[i]f a party has
been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue,
the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law,
can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 52(c);
see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7052 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 52 in adversary proceedings). As
noted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit, “[s]ince the 1991 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(c) has subsumed the role formerly played by Rule
41.” L’Heureux v. Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc. (In re L’Heureux), 322 B.R. 407, 409 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2005).
262. See Nichols Hearing Transcript II, supra note 249, at 11 (“What I would normally do—and I
do this in almost all of my cases—is I have a prove-up hearing. And basically from my standpoint,
because on the student loan issues it’s the Plaintiff that has to show that there’s an undue hardship,
normally at the prove-up hearing I would get the kind of information that you’re walking through
now.”).
263. See supra notes 117–19119 and accompanying text (discussing the bifurcated burden-ofproof structure for educational-debt dischargeability determinations).
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in the litigation stream, if the defendant has no colorable defense on the
merits.” 264
But once the scene changes to a declaratory judgment action that
seeks a determination of the rights of the parties, the possibility exists
that the plaintiff is the party who would have been named as the
defendant in a suit between the parties that sought coercive relief. For
example, an insurer might sue for a declaratory judgment of nonliability
under an insurance policy, even though it is the insured or the
beneficiary that has a claim for coercive relief against the insurer to
recover benefits under the policy. 265 Absent the insurer’s declaratory
judgment action, one could imagine the insured or the beneficiary as
plaintiff suing the insurer as defendant for the amount owed under the
policy (i.e., coercive relief in the form of damages).
Importantly, if the insured did have such a claim, but was sued by the
insurer for a declaratory judgment of nonliability before the insured had
commenced its suit for coercive relief, the insured’s claim would
constitute a compulsory counterclaim that would have to be asserted in
the declaratory judgment action. 266 More specifically, the defendant
would have to plead the counterclaim in the answer to the insurer’s
complaint. 267 Failure to do so would result in waiver of the
counterclaim, 268 unless the defendant amended its answer. 269
Focusing on these principles reveals why the meritorious-defense
prong of the vacatur framework is potentially inapt when a default has
been entered against a defendant in a declaratory judgment action in
which the defendant has a compulsory counterclaim. The default will
have been entered because of the defendant’s failure to file an answer,
and it is in the answer that the defendant must assert the compulsory
counterclaim. If the counterclaim is the point of origin for evaluating the
declaratory relief requested by the plaintiff, then initially asking whether
the defendant has a meritorious defense does not make sense. Returning
264. FREER, supra note 255, § 7.5.4 at 366.
265. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Little Rock Basket Co., 14 F.R.D. 381, 381–82 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
266. See id. Federal Rule 13(a)(1) provides that
[a] pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its service—the pleader
has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and (B) does not require adding another party
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1).
267. FREER, supra note 255, § 12.5.1, at 678.
268. See id. at 679.
269. See id. at 678; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (governing whether a pleading may be amended
before trial).
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to the example of the insurer’s suit for a declaratory judgment of
nonliability, the vacatur framework should initially ask whether the
defendant has a meritorious claim against the insurer for amounts or
benefits owed under the policy. If so, then it is appropriate to ask
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s
allegation of nonliability. If so, then the equities may weigh in favor of
vacating the default for two purposes: (1) to permit the defendant to
answer and assert its compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff and
(2) to resolve the plaintiff’s assertion of nonliability on the merits,
whatever the grounds for that assertion may be (e.g., either the
defendant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for its counterclaim
against the plaintiff or an affirmative defense to the defendant’s
counterclaim).
As an action for declaratory relief,270 which can be commenced either
by the creditor or the debtor, 271 an educational-debt dischargeability
determination presents the opportunity for this unusual procedural
posture to arise when the debtor commences the proceeding and the
creditor subsequently defaults. Like the insurer, the debtor has sought a
determination of nonliability—to wit, that the debt allegedly owed, even
if of the type excepted from discharge on the basis of its educational
nature, 272 is nonetheless dischargeable because its repayment would
impose an undue hardship on the debtor. And like the insured, the
creditor has a compulsory counterclaim—to wit, that the debtor is liable

270. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2170 (discussing declaratory nature of an educationaldebt dischargeability determination).
271. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(a).
272. In the allegations set forth in their complaint, the Nichols pled that they “became indebted
for a student loan” and that, as of the date that the complaint was filed, the balance owed was
$65,661.55. Adversary Complaint at 2, Nichols v. Align W. States Learning Corp. (In re Nichols),
Ch. 7 Case No. 11-12027, Adv. No. 11-00784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2011), ECF No. 1. While
true that “[f]actual assertions in pleadings . . . , unless amended, are considered judicial admissions
conclusively binding on the party who made them,” Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d
224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988), it would be improper to construe such allegations as a judicial admission
by the Nichols that Align had a meritorious claim against them. The allegation referring to the
obligation as a “student loan” lacks sufficient specificity to support a claim that the obligation falls
within the parameters of the Code’s educational debt provision. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62,
at 2113–16 (providing a detailed description of a creditor’s burden of proof in an undue hardship
adversary proceeding). Of course, if the default had been vacated, thereby allowing Align to answer,
the Nichols would have had the right to amend their complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(B);
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7015. And they could have done so in such a way that their allegation of
indebtedness would not absolve Align of its evidentiary burden to establish its prima facie case.
This suggests that the defaulting creditor should be required to set forth its meritorious claim within
the vacatur framework, regardless of whether the factual allegations in the complaint could be
construed as a judicial admission of the merits of the creditor’s claim.
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to pay a sum on an obligation that qualifies as an educational debt
excepted from discharge. 273 Thus, the relevant inquiry under the vacatur
framework should initially be whether the creditor (i.e., the defendant)
has a meritorious claim on this basis against the debtor. If not, the scales
would tip in favor of a finding of nonliability based on the deficiency in
the creditor’s prima facie case for liability, thereby rendering the undue
hardship inquiry—essentially, a defense to liability—irrelevant. 274
If, on the other hand, the creditor were to have a meritorious claim
against the debtor, then the inquiry should shift to whether the creditor
has a meritorious defense to the debtor’s allegation of undue hardship. If
not, such a finding would tilt in favor of letting the default stand. But if
the creditor did establish a meritorious defense, then the interest in
reaching a merits-based determination of the debtor’s undue hardship
allegation would be more compelling. Vacating the default would allow
the creditor to answer and assert its compulsory counterclaim against the
debtor, thereby paving the way for the court to resolve the debtor’s
assertion of nonliability based on undue hardship. This analytical
framework further reinforces the idea that the bankruptcy court in
Nichols absolved Align of one of its key evidentiary burdens—that is,
the burden relating to its claim against the Nichols. 275
At the end of the day, the Ninth Circuit BAP in Nichols appears to
have lost sight of one of its prior opinions, in which the court
emphasized the importance of following proper procedure, specifically
noting that “[w]ell-intentioned shortcuts that give short shrift to orderly
procedure create unfortunate misimpressions about the quality of justice
dispensed in bankruptcy courts, look sloppy, and lead one into
273. A claim arising from a default on a promissory note that evidences a student loan obligation
constitutes a claim for monetary damages. See United States v. Ragan, No. CV 10-7654 RSWL,
2011 WL 2940354, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2011).
274. This would not mean, however, that there did not initially exist a live issue to adjudicate. See
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Coleman (In re Coleman), 560 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009).
275. At least one bankruptcy court has expressly recognized that the declaratory nature of an
educational-debt dischargeability determination is not a basis for abandoning the bifurcated burden
of proof for such a proceeding, even if it is the debtor who commences the proceeding. See Dudley
v. S. Va. Univ. (In re Dudley), 502 B.R. 259, 271 & nn.11–12 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013). A decision
by the Supreme Court in the patent context bolsters this proposition. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, LLC, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014), the Court held that, when a patent
licensee initiates a declaratory judgment against the patentee to establish that the licensee has not
infringed the patent, the burden of proof remains the same as it would in a coercive action for patent
infringement brought by the patentee against the licensee. Id. Specifically, just as a plaintiffpatentee would bear the burden of proof to establish patent infringement in a coercive action against
a defendant-licensee, so too does a defendant-patentee bear the burden of proof in a declaratory
judgment action brought by a plaintiff-licensee seeking a determination of noninfringement. See id.
at 846, 849.

08 - Pardo.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

TAKING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

10/17/2016 8:22 AM

1175

disorienting thickets that present more trouble than they avoid.” 276 Ad
hoc reform efforts through managerial judging may prove to be a viable
avenue for reducing the procedural complexity associated with
vindicating the discharge right, but courts must tread carefully down this
path lest they subvert procedural fairness.
C.

Rule Reform

Procedural reform through the rulemaking process 277 offers the
promise of reducing procedural complexity without the dangers of ad
hoc judicial reform efforts. Through the notice-and-comment framework
for amending the Bankruptcy Rules, one might expect that the input
from a wide array of stakeholders will yield a more considerate and
informed approach to simplifying the process for vindicating discharge
rights. 278 The goal of this Section is to remind practitioners, courts, and

276. Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 908, 916 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
277. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by
general rules . . . the practice and procedure in cases under title 11.”).
278. See generally Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J.
245, 255 (1996) (noting how the process for promulgating the Bankruptcy Rules “gives judges,
lawyers, court clerks, law professors, bar associations, national organizations, and others an
opportunity to analyze and submit written comments regarding . . . proposed [rule] changes”). But
see Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases Make Bad Rules: A Commentary on the
Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L.J. 1141, 1142 (2015) (describing the various ways in which
“[c]ommentators have criticized the rulemaking process for decades”).
It should be noted that the rulemaking process can encompass reform efforts targeting the official
forms used in bankruptcy litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (“The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions . . . in cases
under title 11.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (“[T]he Official Forms prescribed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States shall be observed . . . .”). By way of analogy, a seven-year reform
process undertaken by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to modernize the official
forms used in bankruptcy cases culminated in a set of revised forms that went into effect on
December 1, 2015. See Diane Davis, New Bankruptcy Forms Roll Out Effective Dec. 1, 27 BANKR.
L. REP. (BNA) 1548 (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.bna.com/new-bankruptcy-forms-n57982063647/
[https://perma.cc/N7N3-4V6J]. With self-represented debtors in mind, the modernization project
sought to make the official forms more comprehensible by simplifying them. See Press Release,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, First Revamped Bankruptcy Forms Out for Public Comment (Jan.
8, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/01/08/first-revamped-bankruptcy-forms-out-publiccomment [https://perma.cc/H3Q6-K8MD].
Importantly, simplification can help reduce or eliminate “barriers to understanding,” which in
turn ought to facilitate “lay deployment of professional legal knowledge.” Greiner et al., supra note
176, (manuscript at 6, 8); see also id. (manuscript at 7) (“[W]e further posit that the way
information is currently presented to self-represented individuals—without visual imagery, with
unnecessary details, and without attention to layout and organization—can thwart its effective
deployment.”); cf. Rhodes, supra note 137, at 703 (calling for “a complete overhaul of the Official
Forms, for several purposes,” among them “maximiz[ing] the chances that unsophisticated debtors
will understand what is required.”). Paternalistic concerns over improvident bankruptcy filings,
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policymakers that (1) they have the capacity to reduce such procedural
complexity through the rulemaking process and (2) that they have done
so in the past.
First, as to the possibility of shifting away from full-blown adversary
procedure to vindicate discharge rights, the Supreme Court has
obliquely, yet unmistakably, set forth the blueprint for doing so in the
context of educational-debt dischargeability determinations, noting that
the current litigation framework merely represents a choice by the
drafters of the Bankruptcy Rules and that a less complex procedure
could suffice. 279 More specifically, the Bankruptcy Rules classify only a
limited number of disputes as adversary proceedings. 280 If a dispute does
not qualify as an adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Rules deem the
dispute to be a “contested matter,” which proceeds according to less
complex procedures than an adversary proceeding, 281 including request
for relief by motion. 282 Accordingly, a retreat to less complex procedure
is possible in discharge litigation.
Importantly, precedent exists for making this retreat. Recall that a
proceeding to object to a debtor’s discharge typically qualifies as an
adversary proceeding. 283 The Bankruptcy Code has several provisions
that preclude a court from granting the debtor a discharge if the debtor
has previously received a discharge in a prior case, depending on when
the prior case was commenced and the chapter under which the prior

however, might lead some to disapprove of the reduction of such barriers. See Katy Stech, Critics:
New Bankruptcy Paperwork Will Cause Inaccurate Filings, WALL ST. J.: BANKR. BEAT (Nov. 23,
2015, 3:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2015/11/23/critics-new-bankruptcy-paperworkwill-cause-inaccurate-filings/ [https://perma.cc/N4R3-DAUP] (“Bankruptcy experts who have been
working to freshen up and simplify the new forms since 2008 got an earful from critics who worried
that the clearer instructions—free of legalese and a confusing format—will encourage more people
to file without help from a bankruptcy lawyer. That could lead people to make big mistakes . . . ,
critics said during the public-comment phase of the process.”).
279. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 453 (2004) (“The text of § 523(a)(8)
does not require a summons, and absent [Bankruptcy] Rule 7001(6) a debtor could proceed by
motion . . . .”).
280. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
281. See Fisher Island Ltd. v. Solby+Westbrae Partners (In re Fisher Island Invs., Inc.), 778 F.3d
1172, 1194 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that “contested matters are subject to less elaborate procedures”
than adversary proceedings); Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2005) (“In a contested matter, there is no summons and complaint, pleading rules are
relaxed, counterclaims and third-party practice do not apply, and much pre-trial procedure is either
foreshortened or dispensed with in the interest of time . . . .”).
282. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a). Some of the procedural rules governing adversary
proceedings, however, equally apply in contested matters. See id. 9014(c).
283. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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discharge was granted (the “time-bar provisions”). 284 Prior to 2010, the
Bankruptcy Rules classified all discharge objections as adversary
proceedings. 285 However, with the 2010 amendments to the Bankruptcy
Rules, which took effect on December first of that year, discharge
objections based on the Code’s time-bar provisions no longer qualified
as adversary proceedings, 286 thereby relegating such objections to the
less complex procedures governing contested matters. 287 The Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules provided the following rationale for the
rule change: “Because objections to discharge on these grounds [i.e., the
time-bar provisions] typically present issues more easily resolved than
other objections to discharge, the more formal procedures applicable to
adversary proceedings, such as commencement by a complaint, are not
required.” 288
Implicit in the Committee’s rationale is the idea that the degree of
procedural complexity should be a function of the substantive
complexity of the issues in dispute. Given the limited scope of the 2010
amendment, we might infer that the Committee viewed the other
grounds for discharge objection to be more substantively complex, thus
warranting more complex procedure. Likewise, we might infer that the
Committee would deem the substantive issues that arise in debtdischargeability determinations to be sufficiently complex so as to
justify full-blown adversary procedure.
Using substantive complexity as a metric to guide the optimal level of
procedural complexity, however, presents a classification problem. How
do we determine what qualifies as an issue of sufficient substantive
complexity warranting full-blown adversary procedure? To illustrate the
difficulty here, consider the divergent procedural approaches to
(1) hearings to determine whether the court should approve an
agreement between a debtor and creditor pursuant to which the debtor
will be legally bound to repay a pre-bankruptcy debt that would have
otherwise been discharged (a “reaffirmation agreement”), 289 and
(2) educational-debt dischargeability determinations.

284. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(9), (10), 1328(f) (2012).
285. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(4) (2009) (amended 2010).
286. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(4) (providing that adversary proceedings include “a proceeding
to object to or revoke a discharge, other than an objection to discharge under §§ 727(a)(8), (a)(9), or
1328(f)”).
287. See id. 4004(d).
288. See id. 7001 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment.
289. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
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Among the statutory requirements that must be satisfied for a
reaffirmation agreement to be enforceable, the agreement must “not
impose an undue hardship on the debtor.” 290 The Bankruptcy Code
further provides for a presumption of undue hardship over the sixty-day
period (or longer by court extension) following the filing of the
reaffirmation agreement if the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed
debt exceed the debtor’s monthly disposable income. 291 The debtor may
rebut the presumption upon identifying additional sources of funds that
will enable the debtor to make the scheduled payments. 292 If the debtor
fails to rebut the presumption, the court may deny approval of the
agreement. 293 Of course, the court will have to hold a hearing on these
matters. 294 Because a reaffirmation hearing does not qualify as an
adversary proceeding, 295 it is a contested matter and thus is governed by
less than full-blown adversary procedure. On the other hand,
educational-debt dischargeability determinations, which also entail the
substantive issue of the debtor’s undue hardship, 296 are resolved pursuant
to the more elaborate procedures governing adversary proceedings. 297
What accounts for this differential procedural treatment? One might
argue that the substantive complexity of undue hardship differs
depending on the context, thus justifying differing levels of procedural
complexity. But the text, structure, and legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code all strongly suggest that the undue hardship standard
calls for the same analytical framework to be applied across the different
settings. 298 If that is so, then the substantive-complexity metric would
mean that we either have insufficient procedure in reaffirmation hearings
or excessive procedure in educational-debt dischargeability
determinations. If classification problems regarding substantive
complexity arise when the same statutory language is at issue, it would
seem that using substantive complexity to inform procedural complexity
is not a particularly workable metric.

290. Id. § 524(c)(3)(B), (c)(6)(A)(i).
291. See id. § 524(m)(1).
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c)(1)(K).
295. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
296. See supra Part II.C.3.
297. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6).
298. See Brief for Professor Rafael I. Pardo as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and Urging
Reversal at 7–27, Murphy v. United States, No. 14-1691 (1st Cir. July 29, 2015), 2015 WL
4985562.
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On the other hand, if we think of “access to justice as a function of the
cost of civil litigation,” 299 and if increasing procedural complexity
increases litigation costs, then procedural complexity is anathema to the
cause of access to justice. 300 Relatedly, “[i]f we conceptualize the value
of a debtor’s substantive rights . . . to be inversely related to the extent to
which procedure acts as a barrier to vindicating the substantive right,
then the value of the substantive right will be increasingly diminished”
as the procedure becomes increasingly complex. 301 As such, using cost
reduction as a metric, the Bankruptcy Rules Committee should consider
whether a retreat to less complex procedure in certain types of discharge
litigation would improve access to justice for debtors. 302
CONCLUSION
To place the consequences of the failure to make a robust
commitment to the discharge right, consider a scene from Disturbing the
Universe, 303 a documentary about William Kunstler, the famous civil
rights lawyer. 304 The scene features Kunstler speaking in 1970 about the
“aura of legitimacy” and the “aura of legality.” During the speech,
Kunstler observes the following:
And that is the terrible myth of organized society, that
everything that’s done through the established system is legal—
299. Lee, supra note 65, at 500.
300. Cf. Zorza, supra note 197, at 860–61 (“Thus, a major component of cost reduction comes
from reducing the need for full advocacy services. Moreover, reducing the need for these resources
increases equity by ensuring that access is available for all, regardless of one’s ability to obtain
those advocacy or support resources.”).
301. See Pardo, Thicket, supra note 62, at 2178 (footnote omitted).
302. Cf. Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263 (2009) (arguing “that the structure of the rulemaking process
should be modified to better facilitate an interpretation of the rulemaking mandate that includes
access”). Importantly, the decision to opt for reduced complexity does not necessarily mean that
increased complexity will be unavailable if needed. For example, while some of the procedural rules
governing adversary proceedings equally apply in contested matters, the Bankruptcy Rules provide
courts with the flexibility to apply the other adversary proceeding rules that do not apply by default,
see FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(c), a point noted by the Bankruptcy Rules Committee in connection
with the 2010 amendment, see id. 7001 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (“In an
appropriate case, however, Rule 9014(c) allows the court to order that additional provisions of Part
VII of the rules apply to these matters [i.e., discharge objections based on the Code’s time-bar
provisions].”).
303. DISTURBING THE UNIVERSE (Off Center Media 2009).
304. Among his accomplishments, Kunstler successfully argued before the Supreme Court on
behalf of Gregory Lee Johnson in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398 (1989), the case in which the
Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds Johnson’s conviction for having expressed political
protest by publicly burning an American flag, see id. at 399.
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and that word has a powerful psychological impact. It makes
people believe that there is an order to life, and an order to a
system, and that a person that goes through this order and is
convicted has gotten all that is due him. And therefore society
can turn its conscience off, and look to other things and other
times. 305
Kunstler’s observations about the criminal justice system should
equally inform our thinking about the civil justice system, including the
bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy discharge is a powerful statutory
right, but that right will have no value to intended beneficiaries who
cannot vindicate it as a result of procedural barriers. Without continuous
critical reflection on the process for vindicating the discharge right, we
risk becoming a society that turns its conscience off. At the end of the
day, our approaches to procedural reform will signify how committed
we are as a society to deliver bankruptcy law’s promise of a fresh start to
financially distressed individuals—to wit, whether we are willing to take
bankruptcy rights seriously. 306

305. A video clip and transcript of the scene are available at William Kunstler: Disturbing the
Universe—The
Terrible
Myth,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/pov/disturbingtheuniverse/
terrible_myth.php [https://perma.cc/C2JQ-YGZB] (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
306. See Bruce H. Mann, Failure in the Land of the Free, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (2003)
(“Whether a society forgives its debtors and how it bestows or withholds forgiveness are more than
matters of economic or legal consequence. They go to the heart of what a society values.” (emphasis
added)).
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Distribution of Adversary Proceedings in the Study Population
Number of Adversary
Proceedings Filed Per Case

Number of Cases

Total Proceedings

1

1,170

1,170

2

63

126

3

23

69

4

5

20

6

3

18

7

1

7

8

1

8

12

1

12

08 - Pardo.docx (Do Not Delete)

1182

10/17/2016 8:22 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1115

Table A2
Comparison of Study Population and Representative Sample
Proceeding Characteristic

Study
Population 307

Representative
Sample 308

Debtor Litigation Success

39.0%
(555 of 1,424)

38.5%
(152 of 395)

2012 Adversary Proceeding

53.5%
(765 of 1,430)

52.7%
(208 of 395)

Fully Self-Represented

32.5%
(465 of 1,430)

31.1%
(123 of 395)

Brunner Jurisdiction

88.4%
(1,264 of 1,430)

88.1%
(348 of 395)

ECMC Appearance

41.2%
(588 of 1,426)

42.5%
(168 of 395)

DOE Appearance

35.6%
(508 of 1,426)

38.5%
(152 of 395)

Median/Mean Duration
(Days)

244/291
(n = 1,415)

247/289
(n = 391)

Median/Mean Number of
Filed Documents

23/30
(n = 1,426)

23/31
(n = 395)

Trial Held

6.8%
(97 of 1,426)

7.6%
(30 of 395)

307. The documents in four of the 1,430 adversary proceedings in the Study Population could not
be electronically accessed. Accordingly, some of the figures reported in Table A2 are limited to the
1,426 proceedings for which there was electronic access to the proceedings’ documents. Also, as of
the time of this writing, 1.5% (21 of 1,426) of these electronically accessible proceedings remained
open. Ten of the twenty-one open proceedings, however, appeared to have concluded for all intents
and purposes. Thus, the duration of the proceeding is calculated for 1,415 of the 1,426 electronically
accessible proceedings in the Study Population.
308. At the time of this writing, 1.8% (7 of 395) of the adversary proceedings in the
Representative Sample remained open. Three of the seven open proceedings, however, appeared to
have concluded for all intents and purposes. Thus, duration of the proceeding is calculated for 391
of the 395 proceedings in the Representative Sample.
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Table A3
Distribution of Adversary Proceedings by
Federal Regional Circuit (from Most to Least)

Federal Regional Circuit

Number of
Proceedings

Observed
Judicial
Districts 309

Ninth Circuit

366

13 of 13

Sixth Circuit

210

9 of 9

Eleventh Circuit

167

9 of 9

Third Circuit

112

4 of 5

Seventh Circuit

110

7 of 7

Eighth Circuit

105

10 of 10

Tenth Circuit

92

8 of 8

Fourth Circuit

72

9 of 9

Second Circuit

69

6 of 6

First Circuit

66

5 of 5

Fifth Circuit

59

8 of 9

D.C. Circuit

2

1 of 1

Total

1,430

89 of 91

309. The third column of Table A3 reports (1) the number of federal judicial districts per circuit
in which adversary proceedings from the Study Population were commenced out of (2) the number
of total federal judicial districts per circuit (exclusive of the districts located outside of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico). There are a total of ninety-one federal judicial
districts in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See supra note 99. As Table
A3 indicates, eighty-nine of ninety-one judicial districts were observed. The two districts that were
not observed in the Study Population were the District of Delaware and the Middle District of
Louisiana.

08 - Pardo.docx (Do Not Delete)

1184

10/17/2016 8:22 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1115

Table A4
Bankruptcy Case Financial Characteristics (in 2014 Dollars) of Debtors
Who Filed Educational-Debt Adversary Proceedings in 2011 and 2012
Financial
Characteristic

Median

Mean

Missing
Values

Real Property

$0
[0, 0]

$70,721
[54,149, 87,293]

6 of 395

Personal Property

$9,943
[7,830, 11,763]

$19,537
[16,186, 22,888]

6 of 395

Monthly
Household Income

$1,924
[1,797, 2,040]

$2,433
[2,209, 2,656]

6 of 395

Monthly
Household
Expenses

$2,194
[2,097, 2,507]

$3,490
[2,144, 4,835]

6 of 395

Monthly
Disposable
Household Income

-$61
[-108, -5]

-$1,057
[-2,390, 276]

6 of 395

Educational Debt

$59,315
[48,722, 64,966]

$88,948
[79,045, 98,851]

17 of 395

Total Debt

$165,272
[152,435, 180,043]

$276,903
[224,362, 329,444]

17 of 395

Ratio of
0.41
Educational Debt to
[0.37, 0.47]
Total Debt

0.44
[0.41, 0.48]

18 of 395

Ratio of
Educational Debt to 2.3
Annual Household [2.0, 2.7]
Income 310

5.1
[4.2, 6.0]

34 of 395

310. Eighteen of the thirty-four missing observations for this financial characteristic are
undefined values—that is, the debtors in the cases corresponding to those eighteen observations
listed their monthly household income as $0.
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Table A5
Debtor Litigation Success by Financial Characteristics (in 2014 Dollars)
Real Property
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

$0

$72,205

239

4

Yes

$0

$68,356

150

2

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 0.176; p = 0.8599
Personal Property
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

$9,378

$17,913

239

4

Yes

$11,705

$22,125

150

2

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -1.287; p = 0.1982
Monthly Household Income
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

$1,883

$2,412

239

4

Yes

$1,936

$2,466

150

2

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.414; p = 0.6788
Monthly Household Expenses
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

$2,219

$3,900

239

4

Yes

$2,158

$2,835

150

2

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 0.207; p = 0.8360
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Table A5 (cont.)
Financial Characteristics (in 2014 Dollars) by Debtor Litigation Success
Monthly Disposable Household Income
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

-$61

-$1,488

239

4

Yes

-$60

-$370

150

2

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.219; p = 0.8266
Educational Debt
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

$59,433

$84,708

231

12

Yes

$58,618

$95,610

147

5

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.467; p = 0.6406
Total Debt
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

$163,916

$281,528

239

4

Yes

$167,028

$269,534

150

2

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.594; p = 0.5526
Ratio of Educational Debt to Total Debt
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

0.40

0.44

230

13

Yes

0.45

0.45

147

5

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.440; p = 0.6596
Ratio of Educational Debt
to Annual Household Income
Debtor Litigation Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

2.19

5.27

220

23

Yes

2.53

4.89

141

11

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.632; p = 0.5276
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Table A6
Debtor Litigation Success by Proceeding Duration,
Filed Documents, and Commencement Delay
Proceeding Duration (in Days)
Debtor Litigation
Success

Median

Mean

N

No

237

279

864

Yes

256

308

550

Missing Values
16

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -1.748; p = 0.0805
Filed Documents
Debtor Litigation
Success

Median

Mean

N

No

22

27

869

Yes

27

35

555

Missing Values
6

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -5.384; p < 0.0001
Commencement Delay (in Days)
Debtor Litigation
Success

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

No

94

248

243

0

Yes

90

298

152

0

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 0.487; p = 0.6263
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Table A7
Debtor Litigation Success by Trial Held and Calendar Year
Debtor Litigation Success
Trial Held

No

Yes

Total

No

814
(61.34)

513
(38.66)

1,327
(100.00)

Yes

55
(56.70)

42
(43.30)

97
(100.00)

Total

869
(61.03)

555
(38.97)

1,424
(100.00)

Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chisquare test with one degree of freedom is 0.366.
Debtor Litigation Success
Calendar Year

No

Yes

Total

2011

401
(60.48)

262
(39.52)

663
(100.00)

2012

468
(61.50)

293
(38.50)

761
(100.00)

Total

869
(61.03)

555
(38.97)

1,424
(100.00)

Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chisquare test with one degree of freedom is 0.695.
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Table A8
Logistic Regression Model for Debtor Litigation Success

Variable

Debtor
Litigation Success

Fully Self-Represented

0.311***
(0.177, 0.545)

Brunner Jurisdiction

0.831
(0.410, 1.684)

ECMC Appearance

0.299***
(0.179, 0.500)

DOE Appearance

0.791
(0.481, 1.301)

Duration

0.999
(0.997, 1.000)

Filed Documents

1.029***
(1.014, 1.042)

Educational-Debt-to-Income Ratio

0.996
(0.968, 1.023)

Commencement Delay

1.000
(0.999, 1.001)

Trial

0.832
(0.309, 2.241)

2012 Proceeding

1.011
(0.636, 1.608)

Observations

357

Adjusted Count R2

0.201

Note: *** p ≤ 0.001. Odds ratios presented with 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses.
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Table A9
Predicted Probability of Debtor Litigation Success by
Number of Filed Documents and Represented Status
Represented Status
Number of Filed
Documents

Represented
Debtor

Self-Represented
Debtor

1

40.1%
[28.2, 53.5]

17.7%
[7.4, 28.0]

10

47.1%
[35.1, 59.0]

21.7%
[10.5, 32.8]

20

54.1%
[42.5, 65.6]

26.8%
[14.6, 39.0]

30

61.0%
[49.3, 72.7]

32.7%
[19.1, 46.3]

40

67.4%
[55.3, 79.5]

39.1%
[23.4, 54.5]

50

73.3%
[60.7, 85.8]

46.0%
[28.6, 63.4]

60

78.4%
[65.9, 90.9]

53.0%
[33.7, 72.3]

70

82.8%
[70.6, 94.9]

59.9%
[39.1, 80.7]

80

86.4%
[75.0, 97.8]

66.4%
[44.8, 88.1]
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Table A10
Financial Characteristics (in 2014 Dollars) by Represented Status
Monthly Household Income
Represented Status

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

Represented

$2,055

$2,572

269

3

Self-Represented

$1,609

$2,121

120

3

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 3.275; p = 0.0011
Monthly Disposable Household Income
Represented Status

Median

Mean

N

Missing Values

Represented

-$7

-$291

269

3

Self-Represented

-$212

-$2,775

120

3

Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.757; p = 0.0058

